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Abstract 
The president determines the number of refugees to be admitted to the United States each 
year after consultation with Congress, but there is a gap in literature related to whether 
party affiliation affects refugee admissions. The purpose of this study was to determine 
the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on refugee admissions and any 
moderating effect of Congressional majority affiliations. The eight research questions 
centered on the effect of the president’s party on the refugee ceiling and admissions, 
regional allocations and admissions, and the extent to which Congressional majority 
parties moderate these effects. Total global and regional refugee numbers were controlled 
throughout this study. The theoretical framework of historical institutionalism was used 
to examine political parties as institutions guided by historical positions and choices. This 
quantitative study involved a secondary data analysis of data collected from the U.S. 
government and the United Nations. Hierarchical regression was used to determine the 
relationship between refugee admissions and presidential party affiliation, as well as the 
moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities. Regression analysis showed that 
presidential party affiliation had no significant effect on the refugee admissions, but 
having a Democratic president was predictive of higher admissions of refugees from both 
the Near East and South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. Future researchers 
may examine additional ways that presidential administrations, rather than Congress, 
affect refugee admissions. Positive social change implications include furthering 
understanding of the role of party affiliation in refugee admissions to help refugee service 
providers better prepare for the refugees that will be admitted in the upcoming fiscal year.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
The Refugee Act (1980) outlines the process for admitting refugees to the United 
States. The Refugee Act established that the admissions ceiling, the maximum number of 
refugees permitted for admission to the United States in a given year, and regional 
allocations, the maximum number of refugees to be admitted to the United States from 
specific geographic regions in a given year, is to be set by the president, annually (§ 
207(a)(1)). The president does this each year by issuing a presidential determination, after 
sending a report to Congress and consulting with the Senate and House Committees on 
the Judiciary, also known as the Judiciary Committees (§ 207(d)(1)). In this study, I 
examined the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on annual admissions 
ceiling and regional allocations. I also examined whether the political party affiliation of 
the Senate and House majorities moderated any effect the president’s party affiliation has 
on the same. Because the global number of refugees fluctuates over time, this study 
controlled for the total number of global refugees as well as global refugee totals by 
geographic region. 
In Chapter 1, I review the background on the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
and provide an overview of the literature related to this study. I outline the purpose of the 
study, the research problem, and research questions (RQs) and provide an overview of 
the nature of the study. Chapter 1 includes a preview of historical institutionalism as the 
theoretical framework for this study, with further discussion in Chapter 2. Finally, this 
chapter includes a list of definitions relevant to this study and discussion of the 




 Before the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, U.S. refugee law and policy were 
not wholly distinct from broader U.S. immigration policy, and the United States did not 
have federal law defining refugees that was in line with international law (Scribner, 2017; 
Teitelbaum, 1980). The Refugee Act aligned U.S. federal law with the definition of 
“refugee” as outlined in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), which the 
United States had signed in 1967. The Refugee Act established the current United States 
Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) and determined that the president would consult 
with Congress each year regarding refugee admissions (§ 207(d)(1)) and set the number 
of refugees permitted to be admitted through the USRAP annually. Research published 
within months of the passage of the Refugee Act points to political disagreement about 
the admission of refugees and other immigrants to the United States (Teitelbaum, 1980). 
However, that study did not identify which group or groups held the differing positions 
that its author presented. 
 Refugees are a subset of the broader U.S. immigrant population, having been 
granted entry to the United States with refugee status through the USRAP under the 
provisions of the Refugee Act. Although little research has been done on the effect of 
political party affiliation of the president or the chambers of Congress on refugee 
admissions, much more research is available on political party affiliation and immigration 
policy more broadly (Breshnahan, et al., 2018; Brown & Brown, 2017; Chacon, 2017; 
Doucerain, et al., 2018; Druckman, et al., 2013; Fennelly, et al., 2015; Finley & Esposito, 
2020; Fussell, 2014; Hajnal & Rivedram 2014). Through the 1950s and 1960s, before the 
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Refugee Act, Congressional Republicans and Democrats were divided on immigration 
reforms related to maintaining or eliminating national origin quotas (Triadafilopoulos, 
2010). These quotas limited the number of immigration visas issued based on nationality 
and excluded most immigrants from Asia (U.S. Department of State, n.d.g). This early 
debate on immigration reform saw Republicans favoring maintaining national origin 
quotas. At the same time, Democrats opposed the quotas and advocated for increased 
immigration from multiple countries (Triadafilopoulos, 2010). This trend continued 
through the recent 2018 midterm elections (Torres-Gill & Demko, 2018).  
 A review of asylum cases adjudicated in the 1980s found that asylum seekers who 
had their cases adjudicated by Republican-appointed judges were less likely to be granted 
asylum than those whose cases were adjudicated by judges appointed by Democratic 
presidents (Yarnold, 1990). Researchers examining political positions have found that 
immigration similarly fell along party lines (Barnett, 2002; Breshnahan, et al., 2018; 
Hajnal & Rivera, 2014). Fennelly et al. (2015), in their study of votes taken on 
immigration-related legislation in the 103rd through the 112th Congress (1993-2012), 
found that Republicans consistently favored restricting immigration while Democrats 
consistently voted in favor of expanding it. Fennelly et al. also noted that votes on 
immigration-related issues were “more likely to pit a majority of Democrats against a 
majority of Republicans than votes on all issues combined” (p. 1423). Other researchers 
have consistently found that Republicans are more likely to favor and vote for restrictive 
immigration policies than Democrats, who are more likely to support fewer immigration 
restrictions (Brown & Brown, 2017; Durometer & Méango, 2017; Hawley, 2011).  
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 Despite these findings, little research has been devoted to the effect of political 
party affiliation on refugee policy, specifically, until the election of Donald Trump. 
Trump made refugee policy part of his platform as a presidential candidate. During the 
Trump campaign, then-candidate Trump promised to send Syrian refugees admitted 
through the USRAP back to Syria and ban Muslim refugees from entry to the United 
States (Scribner, 2017, p. 265). Following his election to the presidency, Trump enacted 
Executive Order No. 13,769 (2017) banning the issuance of visas to immigrants and 
refugees from several Muslim-majority countries, reducing the overall number of 
refugees admitted to the United States for the fiscal year (FY), and indefinitely banning 
entry of Syrian refugees to the United States. Executive Order No. 13,769 was 
superseded by Executive Order No. 13,780, which, like the order that preceded it, 
reduced refugee admissions to the United States for the FY, although permitted 
exceptions for entry to the United States from otherwise banned countries for individuals 
who were granted refugee status. 
 In the wake of the 2016 election of President Trump, a substantial body of 
research has been published on the political division over refugee policy, much of it 
along political party lines (Adida, et al., 2019; Finley & Esposito, 2020; Fullerton, 2017; 
Johnson, 2018; Saldaña, et al., 2018). The authors of these studies have focused mainly 
on divisions under the current administration, without consideration for a review of 
political party positions on refugee admissions before the Trump administration. 
Although these researchers have looked at political divisions, they, like scholars who 
have studied earlier divisions on immigration policy along party lines, have not examined 
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data related to refugee admissions. Several researchers (Harvard, 2018; Simeon, 2017; 
Walden, et al., 2017) noted that global refugee levels reached several new annual 
recorded highs between 2015 and 2019 but did not provide an analysis of the impact of 
these changes on U.S. refugee resettlement levels.  
I addressed that gap by examining the effect of the political party affiliation of the 
president on refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. 
Furthermore, I examined whether the political party affiliation of the Senate and House 
majorities moderate any effect that presidential party affiliation has on refugee 
admissions through the USRAP. This study clarified not only whether there are political 
divisions on refugee policy, but the implication of those divisions on refugee admissions 
to the United States. I controlled for annual global refugee levels, both in aggregate and 
by region, when analyzing the effect of party affiliation on refugee admissions to the 
United States. 
Problem Statement 
Since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the number of refugees admitted to 
the United States has been set before the beginning of each federal FY by the president (§ 
207(a)(1)), in consultation with the Committees of the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate (§ 207(d)(1)). The reports submitted for review to the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees detail not only the overall number of refugees to 
be admitted during the upcoming FY, but also the number to be admitted from individual 
regions of the world and from specific population groups. Despite research on the 
politicization of asylum in the United States beginning in the 1980s (Yarnold, 1990) and 
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analysis on the effect of political party affiliation on legislative efforts related to 
immigration since the mid-1990s (Hinojosa & Schey, 1995), little research has been 
conducted on the extent to which the political party affiliation of the president affects 
refugee admissions and whether that effect is moderated by the political party affiliations 
of the Senate and House majorities.  
Following the election of Donald Trump, his administration enacted a series of 
changes to refugee policy and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) 
(Randolph, 2017). As a result, several articles related to the executive orders and USRAP 
changes, as well as to the political party divide on refugee policy, were published 
(Chacón, 2017; Fording & Schram, 2017; Fullerton, 2017; Gostin, 2017; Martin & Ferris, 
2017; Nagel, 2016; Scribner, 2017). Although the recent literature has highlighted current 
political divides on refugee policy, it has not provided an analysis of the effect of political 
party on proposed and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP, either in aggregate 
or by regional or specific population groups. This research addressed the gap in 
understanding the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on proposed 
refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions ceilings and regional 
allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP, in aggregate and by 
region, since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, while controlling for global refugee 
levels, in aggregate and by region. I further explored whether the political party 
affiliation of the Senate and House majorities moderates any effect of the president’s 
political party affiliation on refugee admissions, while controlling for overall and regional 




 The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the political party 
affiliation of the president affects the proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the 
annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions 
through the USRAP and whether that effect is moderated by the political party 
affiliations of the Senate and House majorities. In this quantitative study, I explored how 
the dependent variable of the political party affiliation of the president affects the 
variables of the annual admissions ceiling, actual annual admissions, regional allocations, 
and actual regional admissions, while controlling for global refugee population levels. I 
also examined whether the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on refugee admissions, while 
controlling for the number of refugees worldwide and by region. These variables were 
reviewed by federal FY since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which established 
the current refugee admissions process. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
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RQ2: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H02: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP. 
Ha2: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP. 
RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on 
USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H03: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional allocations. 
Ha3: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional allocations. 
RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on 
USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H04: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional admissions. 
Ha4: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional admissions. 
RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual 
admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
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H05: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
Ha5: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions 
through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H06: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP. 
Ha6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP. 
RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional 
allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H07: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional allocations. 
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Ha7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional allocations. 
RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional 
admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H08: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional admissions. 
Ha8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional admissions. 
Theoretical Framework 
 The theoretical framework for this study was historical institutionalism. Historical 
institutionalism understands institutions, including political parties, as guided in decision 
making by historical positions and choices (Steinmo et al., 1992). This path dependence, 
or dependence on previous decisions and historical directions, makes institutions slow to 
change. Ware (1996) noted that this dependence can make institutions into “prisoners [of] 
their own history” (p. 18) and reluctant to move in new directions. Although historical 
institutionalism is tied closely to the concept of path dependence, it does not maintain 
that institutions are unable to change. Sorensen (2015) argued that institutional change 
does occur, often through incremental steps, but other times through “major upheavals” 
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(p. 19) that lead to new institutional positions or directions. Although gradual, 
incremental change is frequently a result of forces within the institution, whereas abrupt 
changes are often caused by external forces (Capoccia, 2016). As my focus was on 
examining the effects of political party affiliation on refugee admissions, I evaluated the 
extent to which parties have either remained steadfast in their positions, as exemplified in 
current political divisions over refugee admissions, or if the Trump administration’s 
policies represent an abrupt departure from past policy positions. Historical 
institutionalism is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study was quantitative research using a nonexperimental 
correlative design. It was an independent-measure study consistent with the goal of 
understanding how the political party affiliation affects refugee admission to the United 
States. Both proposed and actual refugee admissions, in aggregate and by region, were 
examined by federal FY compared to the political party affiliations of the president and 
Senate and House majorities during the same FYs. Data on refugee admissions were 
available online through the Refugee Processing Center (RPC), which is operated by the 
U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). The 
RPC makes refugee admissions data since 1975, including data by region, available 
online. The RPC also makes available online the annual reports to Congress since FY 
2004. Annual Presidential Determinations on refugee admissions since the passage of the 




Admissions ceiling: The maximum number of refugees permitted to enter the 
United States in a given FY, as set annually by presidential determination (Martin & 
Yankay, 2013). 
Asylee: A type of immigrant. As it relates to this study, an asylee is an individual 
in the United States, or at a port of entry to the United States, who is unable to return to 
or to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality (or, for those 
without a nationality, outside of their country of habitual residence) due to a well-
founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group and is seeking protection in the United States. 
Asylees in the United States are present in the country before being granted asylum status 
(International Rescue Committee, 2018; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service 
[USCIS], n.d.a). 
Bureau of Populations, Refugees, and Migration (PRM): A bureau of the U.S. 
Department of State that has primary management responsibility for USRAP, including 
responsibility for overseas refugee processing and managing processing priorities 
(USCIS, n.d.b). 
Country of first asylum: The first safe country that an individual travels to after 
fleeing their country of origin (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
[UNHCR], n.d.). 
Federal fiscal year (FY): The U.S. federal FY, which operates October through 
September and is named according to the year in which the FY ends (e.g., October 2018–
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September 2019 is FY19). Refugee admissions to the United States are managed on a FY 
basis (USAGov, n.d.). 
House majority: The political party holding the majority of seats in the House of 
Representatives; the House Majority Leader is elected by the party holding the majority 
of seats in the House as their spokesperson for their party (U.S. House of 
Representatives, n.d., para. 6). 
Immigrant: A broad term that refers to an individual born outside the United 
States as a non-U.S. citizen and who now resides in the United States (International 
Rescue Committee, 2018). 
Presidential determination: For the purpose of this study, a document issued by 
the president each FY that establishes the overall number of refugees to be admitted to 
the United States during the upcoming FY and number of refugees per region who can be 
admitted (USCIS, n.d.b).  
Presidential party: The “organization that selected and supported the candidate 
who ran under its label and who subsequently became president” (Passarelli, 2019, p. 88).  
Refugee: A specific type of immigrant who is outside of their country of 
nationality (or, for those without a nationality, outside of their country of habitual 
residence) and who is unable to return to or to avail themselves of the protection of that 
country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group (8 USC 12 § 
1101(a)(42)). Refugees in the United States are accepted to the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
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Program (USRAP) while outside of the United States and then enter the United States on 
a refugee visa (International Rescue Committee, 2018). 
Regional admissions: The number of refugees admitted from a specific global 
region during a federal FY (Bruno, 2018, p. 6). 
Regional allocations: The maximum number of refugees permitted to enter the 
United States from each region of the world in a given FY. These allocations are subsets 
of the overall admissions ceiling (Martin & Yankay, 2013). 
Report to Congress: For the purpose of this study, an annual report submitted on 
behalf of the president to the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary with 
proposed refugee admissions for the upcoming FY (U.S. Department of State, 2018). 
Senate majority: The political party holding the majority of seats in the Senate; 
the Senate Majority Leader is elected by the party holding the majority of seats in the 
Senate as the spokesperson for their party (U.S. Senate, n.d., para. 2). 
Total global refugees: Total global refugees recognized in accordance with the 
UNHCR Statute, not including Palestinian refugees in the Near East, who are under the 
mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (Goddard, 2009, p. 475). 
Unallocated reserve: The number of refugee admissions slots not designated for a 
specific geographic region but reserved to be used for refugees from any region should 
the need develop for refugee slots in excess of the number provided in the regional 
allocation (Bruno, 2015, Summary section, para. 1). 
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United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP): An interagency 
collaboration between governmental and nongovernmental agencies in the United States 
and abroad to identify, screen, and admit refugees for resettlement to the United States 
(USCIS, n.d.b). 
Assumptions 
 In this study, I assumed that the president has more considerable influence over 
refugee admissions than does Congress. This assumption is based on the fact that the 
president sets proposed refugee admissions by presidential determination (Refugee Act of 
1980 § 94 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1)) based on an annual report to Congress by the current 
administration (§ 207 (d)(1)). Although both the Senate and House Committees on the 
Judiciary consult with the president on refugee admissions, it is the presidential 
determination that ultimately sets the final admissions number, both in total and by 
region. Therefore, I examined the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
proposed and actual refugee admissions, while reviewing the potential moderation of 
those effects by the political party affiliations of Senate and House majorities. 
Scope and Delimitations 
 Given the relatively short history of refugee admissions to the United States under 
the Refugee Act of 1980, I examined data from FY81-FY19, inclusively. FY81, which 
began October 1, 1980, is the first FY in which refugees were admitted to the United 
States following the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which was signed into law on 
March 17, 1980. FY19 was the most recent FY for which complete refugee admissions 
data were available at the time of this study’s proposal. Because this study included 
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complete data from all years of refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act, 
there are no generalizability concerns. 
 I controlled for the total number of refugees globally, as well as the total 
population of refugees by geographic region since the passage of the Refugee Act. The 
UNHCR, the U.N. refugee agency, makes global refugee numbers available for all 
refugees worldwide, as well as by refugee country of nationality. Worldwide refugee 
population data are available from the UNHCR, beginning with data from 1951. I 
included data beginning from 1979.  
Limitations 
This study was limited in its focus on Senate and House majorities rather than on 
the individual members of the Senate and House Committees of the Judiciary. Although 
majorities of both Committees reflect the majorities in each chamber of the Congress, this 
study did not account for the relative influence of members of the Judiciary Committees. 
I also did not account for the nature of the relationship between the chairs of the Judiciary 
Committees and the president.  
This study is also limited to analysis of the effect of political party affiliation and 
did not include a consideration of external political factors, which may be confounding 
variables. Although global refugee levels, both in aggregate and by region, may be effects 
of global political events, I did not address those political events specifically. Previous 
studies have demonstrated that refugee populations resettled by the United States are 
negatively correlated with locations of U.S. military engagement without regard for the 
severity of the refugee situation in those locations (Berman, 2011, p 124). Future 
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researchers could explore external factors, such as military engagement, as covariates 
with political party to analyze their effect on refugee admissions. 
Because the study includes data from each year since the passage of the Refugee 
Act of 1980 (FY81-FY19) and each year of global refugee data for calendar years 1979-
2018 from the UNHCR, the outcomes are valid as the entire population being studied was 
available rather than a sample of the population. Because PRM’s regional groupings of 
countries changed over time, each FY (FY81-FY03) required some level of 
recategorization of countries into region to align with current regional groupings. 
Additionally, the UNHCR does not categorize countries into region in its annual data, 
and countries of nationality and countries of first asylum were grouped into regions 
corresponding with Department of State regional designations. These categorizations and 
recategorizations into groupings that could be compared over time are a potential threat 
to internal validity in this study (see Babbie, 2017). I discus the process of 
operationalizing these variables in detail in Chapter 3. In discussions of the relationship 
between the Trump administration, it should be noted that the FYs included in this study 
only account for a portion of the years of the Trump administration and do not include 
presidential determinations for FY20 or FY21 and arrivals for FY20. 
Significance 
I found no reviews of the effect of political party affiliation on proposed or actual 
refugee admissions through the USRAP that were published before the election of 
President Trump. Without a review of the extent to which party affiliation has affected 
refugee admissions historically, one cannot identify whether the current political divide 
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on refugee policy is a contemporary anomaly or whether it has existed since the 
enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. This research addresses the gap in understanding 
the current political divisions related to refugee policy within the broader context of the 
history of the USRAP. It provides a framework for understanding the relationship 
between political party and refugee policy for those working in refugee admissions and 
resettlement. 
Despite the lack of research on the subject, refugee resettlement and human rights 
organizations hold that the USRAP has long held bipartisan support before the current 
administration (Human Rights First, n.d.; U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
[USCRI], 2017). The ability to anticipate the number of refugee admissions and the 
backgrounds of those refugees is essential to refugee resettlement organizations. As 
funding for refugee resettlement is provided by the U.S. government on a per capita basis 
(i.e., funded based on the number of refugees the organization resettles each year; U.S. 
Department of State, 2017), the ability to anticipate the number of refugee admissions in 
an upcoming FY is critical to a resettlement agency’s ability to plan fiscally. Predicting 
the background of refugees who will be admitted through the USRAP helps resettlement 
organizations prepare for the specific linguistic and cultural needs of anticipated refugee 
groups. This study contributes to positive social change by providing resettlement 
agencies with information to help prepare in advance for the number and backgrounds of 
refugees that will be admitted through the USRAP. Resettlement agencies may be better 
equipped to anticipate refugee admissions and, as a result, improve the quality of services 




Despite the existing research on the correlation between political party affiliation 
and immigration policy positions and the current research on political party affiliation as 
it relates to refugee policy, there is no research on the effect of political party affiliation 
on the implementation of refugee policy as measured by proposed and actual refugee 
admissions. As resettlement agencies are funded on a per capita basis, the ability to 
anticipate the number of refugees who will be admitted to the United States in an 
upcoming FY against a current FY is vital to financial planning. Likewise, the ability to 
anticipate regional allocations in future years against a current year allows agencies to 
plan for the cultural and linguistic needs of the refugees they will serve. Chapter 2 
provides a thorough review of existing literature. I also substantiate historical 
institutionalism as the appropriate framework for this study.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the political party 
affiliation of the president affects proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual 
admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the 
USRAP and whether these effects are moderated by the political party affiliations of the 
Senate and House majorities, while controlling for global and regional refugee levels. 
The resettlement agencies that provide refugee resettlement services in cooperation with 
the USRAP hold that refugee resettlement enjoyed bipartisan support before the election 
of Donald Trump (USCRI, 2017). Recent literature (Adida et al., 2019; Finley & 
Esposito, 2020; Fullerton, 2017; Johnson, 2018; Saldaña, et al., 2018; Schmidt, 2019; 
Scribner, 2017) has highlighted political divisions on refugee policy under the Trump 
administration but has not provided an analysis of political divisions or unity before the 
Trump administration.  
 In this chapter, I provide an overview of the literature search strategy and the 
theoretical framework of this study and review the existing literature. This literature 
review includes a history of refugee resettlement in the United States before the passage 
of the Refugee Act of 1980; the passage of the Refugee Act and the establishment of the 
USRAP; political positions on immigration, broadly, and refugee policy, specifically, 
since the passage of the Refugee Act; and refugee policy under the Trump administration.  
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Literature Search Strategy 
I used Google Scholar and several databases available through Walden 
University, including Academic Search Complete, Nexis Uni (formerly LexisNexis 
Academic), Political Science Complete, ProQuest Central, SAGE Journals, SAGE 
Premier, and the multidatabase search engine Thoreau Multi-Database Search, to identify 
relevant literature. Search terms for these databases included USRAP, United States 
Refugee Admissions Program, refugee resettlement, admissions ceiling, refugee 
admissions ceiling, refugee priority groups, refugee politics, refugee policy, immigration 
policy, and refugee P2 groups, and the Boolean searches USRAP “political party,” 
“refugee admissions” “political party,” immigration “political party,” asylum “political 
party,” refugee “presidential determination,” refugee “report to congress,” refugee 
“political party,” and “admissions ceiling” “political party.” The focus of these searches 
was peer-reviewed literature published 2015-2020. Because research has not been 
conducted on the history of political positions related to refugee policy and admissions, I 
included limited searches for relevant literature in the 2000s, 1990s, and 1980s that could 
provide contemporaneous accounts of political beliefs about immigration and refugee 
policy. 
In reviewing the available literature, I found limited studies on refugee policy in 
the United States, the majority of which focused on policies related to the services 
refugees receive following their resettlement (Dubus, 2018; Gilhooly & Lee, 2017; 
Gonzalez Benson, 2017). Few studies considered refugee admissions policy, and those 
that did were primarily concerned with refugee admissions policies beginning in the 
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Trump administration (Fullerton, 2017; Gostin, 2017; Saldaña, et al., 2018). Given these 
limitations, the literature review was broadened to include studies on immigration policy 
in the United States, as refugee policies are a subset of broader immigration policy. Also 
considered was the limited research that has been conducted on asylum policy in the 
United States, as asylum policy and refugee policy are related in that both asylees and 
refugees are defined in U.S. and international law as individuals feeling persecution in 
their country of nationality (Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952; Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, 1967). 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical framework for this study was historical institutionalism. Steinmo 
et al. (1992) first discussed historical institutionalism in Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, in which they defined institutions as 
organizations as well as the rules, practices, norms, values, and social conventions that 
order the organization’s conduct. These institutions can include branches of government, 
political parties, and the structure of political party systems (Steinmo et al., 1992). In 
seeking to understand institutions and institutional behavior, historical institutionalism is 
concerned with not only contemporary institutional positions and practices but also the 
origins of those positions and practices, viewing institutions as “the legacy of historical 
processes” (Thelen, 1999, p. 382). Historical institutionalism argues that the strategies 
and goals pursued by individuals within organizations are shaped by their institutional 
and organizational contexts (Steinmo et al., 1992).  
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 As with other branches of neo-institutionalism, historical institutionalism includes 
path dependence as a central idea. Path dependence holds that, once an institution 
establishes a belief or practice, it becomes increasingly difficult to change that idea or 
practice as time progresses (Fioretos, 2011). Consequently, beliefs and choices that occur 
early on in an institution’s development can have a significant impact over the life of the 
institution (Sorensen, 2015, p. 21). Given this path dependence, theorists must explain 
how institutional change occurs, despite the institutional tendency to remain set in an 
established path. Before Steinmo et al.’s (1992) seminal work on historical 
institutionalism, the prominent model of understanding institutional change in neo-
institutional literature was punctuated equilibrium. In the punctuated equilibrium model, 
institutions generally enjoy extended periods of stability or equilibrium that are 
punctuated by occasional crises resulting in institutional change, after which institutions 
return to a state of equilibrium (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 15).  
  In contrast to the punctuated equilibrium model, historical institutionalism posits 
a model of institutional change characterized by institutional dynamism or the dynamic, 
rather than static, nature of organizations and how institutional dynamics either reinforce 
or gradually change institutions. (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 16). Ikenberry (1994) noted that 
the historical institutional approach to path dependency is a “critical junctures and 
developmental pathways” (p. 16) approach, which holds that basic institutional logic is 
set during critical moments. The approach holds that future changes tend to be further 
developments or extensions of what was set in those crucial moments, rather than 
departures from them. In considering institutional dynamics, historical institutionalism 
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looks both at mechanisms that maintain institutional trajectories and those that result in 
institutional changes. 
 Fundamental mechanisms that maintain institutional trajectories, or those that 
result in further development or extensions of those paths set during previous critical 
moments, include positive feedback, increasing returns, and sunk costs (Fioretos, 2011, p. 
374; Thelen, 1999). Positive feedback most often consists of the generation of positive 
external collaborators, supporters, and networks resulting from a position or choice 
(Fioretos, 2011, p. 377). Positive feedback can also result from an individual using their 
institutional authority to create institutional rules that strengthen their positions of power 
(Sorensen, 2015, p. 23). Increasing returns refers to the initial benefits that an institution 
receives from taking a position (positive feedback) and how they benefit from 
maintaining that position increases over time when compared to alternative positions 
(Fioretos, 2011). Although alternative positions may have, at one time, been equally 
beneficial to the institution as the chosen position, over time, the chosen position’s 
benefits become increasingly helpful when compared to the benefits the institution would 
gain from changing positions. Sunk costs refer to the idea that individuals within 
institutions must weigh the costs and benefits of change against “maintaining or losing 
their investments in past arrangements” (Fioretos, 2011, p. 373). Individuals who hold 
positions of power within institutions may owe their current positions to those who came 
before them in the movement, the movement’s founder, or another institutional leader or 
may owe their position of power to historical choices the institution made to follow 
specific ideational positions. 
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 Contrary to the punctuated equilibrium model, historical institutionalism focuses 
on gradual institutional change. Historical institutionalism holds that most institutional 
change happens gradually over time, rather than in through radical change. However, 
radical change is not considered impossible within a historical institutionalist framework 
(Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen, 2015). Fioretos (2011, p. 347) identified four sources of this 
incremental change: layering, drift, conversion, and displacement. Layering involves 
creating a new policy without eliminating an old policy (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). Where 
eliminating an old policy or practice may prove controversial and create conflict within 
an institution, layering a new policy over an old policy can create gradual change without 
disrupting institutional relationships. Drift refers to the transformation of an otherwise 
stable policy as a result of changing circumstances (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). As exogenous 
changes occur, institutions may shift or drift in a position to adapt to new conditions 
(Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 17). Conversion refers to internal policy adaptations through the 
way they are implemented (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). Rather than changes to the policy or 
position itself, conversion concerns changes in implementation, which may, over time, 
result in changes in outcomes. Displacement refers to the rescission and replacement of 
existing institutional policy (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). Whereas layering creates a new 
policy without eliminating the previous policy, displacement represents a formal 
replacement of an existing policy or position with a new one. 
 In considering radical changes to institutions, historical institutionalism holds that 
such changes can happen one of two ways. First, radical change can result from the 
accumulation of gradual changes that have occurred over time (Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen, 
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2015). Indeed, historical institutionalism holds that the accumulation of incremental 
changes represents the most common cause for radical institutional reforms. Radical 
change can, however, also occur from “exogenous shocks” (Fioretos, 2011, p. 374). Such 
external shocks are like the punctuations identified in punctuated equilibrium theory. 
However, historical institutionalism does not hold that such shocks are necessary for 
institutional change, nor are they the most common cause of institutional change. 
 This study was concerned with the effect of the political party affiliation of the 
president with refugee admissions to the United States, along with any moderating effect 
had by the political party affiliations of the Senate and House. Steinmo et al. (1992) 
identified political parties as institutions in their seminal work on historical 
institutionalism. By examining the effect of political party affiliation on refugee 
admissions to the United States, this study identified whether the sharp reductions in 
refugee admissions under the Trump administration are the result of accumulated 
incremental changes toward refugee reductions by the Republican Party or represent an 
exogenous shock to Republican positions on refugee resettlement in the United States. 
Literature Review 
History of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Until 1980 
 Refugees are one type of immigrant, so understanding current refugee policy and 
the policies that led to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 requires an understanding 
of broader U.S. immigration laws. Control over immigration is generally considered to be 
one of the few “universal attributes” (p. 21) of national sovereignty (Teitelbaum, 1980). 
Until Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889), which established that immigration 
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regulation was a federal responsibility, U.S. immigration policy was a patchwork of state 
and federal laws (Steil & Vasi, 2014, p. 1108).  
 Before WWII, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, immigration policies were 
based on employer demands for labor and nation-building, with a focus on maintaining 
national homogeneity be implementing restrictions on nations of origin (Akbari & 
MacDonald, 2014, p. 805; Triadafilopoulos, 2010, p. 169). Among the most well-known 
immigration acts of this time is the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), which was passed in 
reaction to Chinese immigration to California and the U.S. West Coast to work as 
laborers (Zolberg, 1988). Hutchinson (1981) noted that beginning in the 1880s, Congress 
provided for the admission of immigrants who would otherwise have been excluded, if 
they were seeking to immigrate to the United States “to avoid persecution or punishment 
on religious or political grounds” (as cited in Zolberg, 1988, p. 653). Although these 
exemptions permitted admittance of those who would otherwise have been excluded 
based on factors such as illiteracy or ability to be economically self-sufficient, such 
admissions were still governed by existing quotas that restricted immigration by national 
origin. These national origin quotas benefited many Eastern European Jews and 
Armenian Christians while continuing to exclude groups such as the Chinese (Zolberg, 
1988). Under these exemptions, more than 2 million Eastern European Jews were 
admitted to the United States between 1881 and 1914 (Zolberg, 1988, p. 654). 
 The next major attempt to address special groups of immigrants fleeing 
persecution was the Act to Regulate the Admission of Aliens to and the Residence of 
Aliens in the United States (1917), also known as the Immigration Act of 1917, which 
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was vetoed by President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, due to his opposition to the law’s 
literacy requirement and based on his belief that an exemption for those fleeing 
persecution would require the United States to pass judgment on other governments 
(Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 19). Seven years later, the Act to Limit the Immigration of 
Aliens into the United States (1924), also known as the Immigration Act of 1924, 
supplanted prior immigration acts and effectively banned Asian and African immigration 
to the United States, while putting significant limitations on Eastern European 
immigration (Fussell, 2014). The act remained in place until after WWII. Millions of 
people were displaced across Europe following WWII, having fled political, religious, 
and ethnic persecution (Brown & Scribner, 2014). Despite the displaced millions, opinion 
was mixed about accepting Jewish refugees into the United States. Members of Congress 
feared that Nazi spies could be among those claiming to be Jewish refugees, and to accept 
them would be to put the United States in danger (Welch, 2014). Although Roosevelt 
supporters were more likely to support allowing Jewish refugees to be admitted to the 
United States, only 23% of Americans supported raising quotas to allow for more Jewish 
refugees and immigrants to enter the country (Welch, 2014, pp. 627-628). 
 In response to the refugee crisis in Europe, President Harry Truman, a Democrat, 
advocated in 1946 for the United States to admit refugees fleeing communist regimes. 
Truman was opposed by Senator Chapman Revercomb (R-WV), who stated his belief 
that the United States should not accept anyone from communist countries, as they would 
bring with them their communist ways of thinking and negatively influence the American 
people (Scribner, 2017, p. 268). Despite such opposition, the Displaced Persons Act 
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(1948) passed with Truman in office, which allowed for the admission of 200,000 
Eastern European refugees into the United States. Although not increasing the number of 
available visas for immigrants, the Displaced Persons Act was the first legislative act that 
specifically addressed refugee immigration (Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 20).  
After the Displaced Persons Act expired in 1952, Congress passed the Refugee 
Relief Act (1953), which was signed into law by President Dwight Eisenhower, a 
Republican (Martin & Ferris, 2017). The Refugee Relief Act specifically allowed for the 
admission of individuals who entered displaced persons camps after 1945, and such 
entries were in addition to, rather than subject to, existing national origin quotas (Martin 
& Ferris, 2017, p. 20). Eisenhower went on to approve the admission of an additional 
38,000 Hungarian refugees between late 1956 and May 1957 who had been displaced by 
the Hungarian uprising of 1956 (Brown & Scribner, 2014; Martin & Ferris, 2017). 1957 
saw the passage of the Refugee-Escapee Act (1957), which allowed for admission to the 
United States of those who had escaped a communist or Middle Eastern country fleeing 
persecution for racial, religious, or political reasons (Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 20). This 
ad hoc approach to addressing refugee needs continued under the presidency of John 
Kennedy, a Democrat, who admitted 100,000 Cuban refugees between January 1959–
December 1960, which led to the establishment of the Migration and Refugee Assistance 
Act (1962) to fund support for refugees, mainly Cuban nationals living in Miami, Florida 
(Brown & Scribner, 2014).  
The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (1965) (INA) under President 
Lyndon Johnson, a Democrat, marked a departure for U.S. immigration laws that had 
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been based on national origin quotas. The INA replaced national origin quotas with a 
focus on family reunification and skilled immigrants that have remained focuses of the 
U.S. immigration system (Drometer & Méango, 2017). Despite removing national origin 
quotas, the INA continued to favor European immigrants while limiting immigration 
from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, giving particular preference to immigrants 
Western and Northern European countries (Barkdull et al., 2012; Fussell, 2014). The INA 
reserved 6% of visas for refugees. Still, it did not establish a formal refugee admissions 
process nor align the definition of refugee with the refugee definition established by the 
United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) (Tichenor, 
2016, p. 691), to which the United States declined to be a party. 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was focused, 
specifically, on addressing the needs of European refugees who had been displaced “as a 
result of events occurring before 1 January 1951”. When the United Nations met in 1967, 
the Protocols Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) was issued and expended 
protections by eliminating geographic and time limitations (Brown & Scribner, 2014). 
Although the United States ratified the Protocol in 1968 (Fitzpatrick, 1997), refugee 
admissions continued on an ad hoc basis through emergency legislations such as the 
Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (1975) after the fall of Saigon under 
president Gerald Ford, a Republican, that admitted 130,000 refugees from Cambodia, 
Laos, and Vietnam (Brown & Scribner, 2014) and the admission of 640,000 Cubans 




The Refugee Act of 1980 and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
 By the end of the 1970s, as many as 14,000 Southeast Asian refugees affected by 
the Vietnam War were arriving in the United States each month (Gonzalez Benson, 
2016). In response, Congress held hearings in 1979 to examine how to best address this 
spike in admissions (Gonzalez Benson, 2016). Senator Dick Clark (D-IA), who had been 
appointed to be the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in his testimony before the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated the need for “permanent and consistent refugee 
policy” (Brown & Scribner, 2014, p. 104) to replace the ad hoc responses to various 
refugee crises (Brown & Scribner, 2014, p. 104). The Refugee Act of 1980 was first 
introduced as S. 643 by Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and, after passing the Senate, 
Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY) and Peter Rodina (D-NJ) sponsored the same as HR 2816. In 
testimony before the House, proponents of the Act argued that it would give Congress 
“greater and more explicit power than it has had before with regard to the numbers and 
nature of refugees to be admitted to this country” (H.R. Rep. No. 69-2, at 4500 (1980)). 
The Act passed the House with 63% of Democrats voting in favor and 72% of 
Republicans voting against the Act (GovTrack, n.d.), and was signed into law by 
President Jimmy Carter.  
 Despite passing through a Democratically controlled Congress and being signed 
into law by a Democratic president, the Refugee Act was not without detractors. Echoing 
Revercomb’s objections to admitting communists in 1946, opponents of the Refugee Act 
also expressed concerns that admitting refugees from the Soviet Union under the Refugee 
Act would admit communists who could undermine the United States from within 
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(Scribner, 2017, p. 268). Other opponents worried that the Refugee Act would undermine 
existing immigration policies that favored Europeans (Scribner, 2017, p. 268). These 
concerns were not limited to politicians. A 1980 national poll indicated that only 19% of 
U.S. respondents wanted to expand refugee admissions to Indochinese refugees 
(Teitelbaum 1980, p. 21).  
 Concerns about moving away from European-favoring policies were not 
unfounded. The Refugee Act represented a move toward non-discriminative immigration 
policies and into alignment with the 1967 Protocols (Brown & Scribner, 2014; 
Teitelbaum, 1980). These were not the primary focus of the Refugee Act, however, 
which was to establish uniform refugee admissions and assistance procedures through the 
establishment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (Barkdull et al., 2012; Brown & 
Scribner, 2014; Congressional Digest, 2016; Vialet, 1999).  
 While the Senate and House Judiciary Committees have primary responsibility for 
and jurisdiction over immigration issues (Fennelly et al., 2015), the Refugee Act 
delegates to the Executive Branch the annual refugee admissions ceiling and regional 
allocations, based mainly on the administration’s belief about strategic benefits of 
resettlement of specific populations (Berman, 2011). U.S. geography and the USRAP’s 
overseas refugee admissions processing allows the administration to choose the 
nationalities, ethnicities, and other qualities of refugees to be admitted (Berman, 2011). 
The president’s administration is required to submit a report to the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees outlining the intended ceiling and regional allocations (Bruno, 
2015), then cabinet-level representatives meet in-person with representatives from the 
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Judiciary Committees to discuss the administration’s report before the president issues 
the annual presidential determination finalizing the ceiling and regional allocations 
(Bruno, 2015). Despite the legislative history of the Refugee Act making clear that 
Congress intended to maintain active participation in refugee admissions (Harvard 
Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, 2018), the Refugee Act does not require 
congressional approval of the ceiling or regional allocations, but only requires that 
cabinet-level members of the administration consult with Congress (Congressional 
Digest, 2016, p. 5).  
 While the presidential determination sets the total admissions ceiling at the start 
of each fiscal year, these have been periodically modified in acknowledgement of 
changing global realities. Changes to the admissions ceiling may be done by issuing a 
new presidential determination or through executive order. In both FY88 and FY89, 
annual ceilings were increased through presidential determination by 15,000 and 22,500, 
respectively, to address the growing numbers of refugees from Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union (Determination No. 88-16, 53 Fed. Reg. 21405 (May 20, 1988); 
Determination No. 89-15, 54 Fed. Reg. 31493 (June 19, 1989)). In FY99, the ceiling was 
increased through presidential determination by 13,000 to accommodate Kosovar 
refugees (Determination No. 99-33, 64 Fed. Ref. 47341 (Aug. 12, 1999)). The reduction 
in the admissions ceiling under the Trump administration through Executive Orders Nos. 
13,769 and 13,760 in FY17 represents the only instance in which the ceiling has been 
lowered, rather than increased, mid-fiscal year. While regional allocations can be 
modified, increases in regional allocations are generally resultant from using part or all of 
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the unallocated reserve for the given fiscal year, rather than by presidential determination 
(Bruno, 2015, p. 3).  
 The USRAP is not a single entity, but rather a collaboration of many agencies 
including USCIS, part of the Department of Homeland Security; PRM, part of the 
Department of State; and the Office of Refugee Resettlement, part of the Department of 
Health and Human Services (Biddle, 2018). PRM works collaboratively with the 
UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to manage overseas 
processing of refugees before their admission to the United States (Biddle, 2018). As of 
2016, the United Nations estimated that there were 20 million refugees globally, not 
including an additional 5 million Palestinians (Colloton, 2016). For each refugee, the 
United Nations seeks one of three “durable solutions” (Brown & Scribner, 2014). The 
first durable solution, voluntary repatriation, involves a refugee being able to return to 
their country of nationality when there is no longer a threat of persecution (Brown & 
Scribner, 2014). The second durable solution, local integration, involves a refugee being 
able to remain safely in the country in which they currently reside, generally their country 
of first asylum, after fleeing their country of nationality (Brown & Scribner, 2014). This 
solution requires that the refugee be provided with valid access to socio-economic, legal, 
civil, and human rights in that country (Brown & Scribner, 2014). The third option, third-
country resettlement, involving resettlement to a third country (other than the country of 
nationality and the country of first asylum) is considered for those who are “in urgent 
need of protection and [those] for whom other durable solutions are not feasible” 
(Thomas-Greenfield, 2001, p. 165). Resettlement is the last UNHCR option and only 
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available to less than 1% of refugees in the world (Lindsay, 2017), and the USRAP 
represents the United States’ program for admitting such refugees.  
 Refugee admissions have fluctuated from a high of 159,252 in FY81 to a low of 
22,491 in FY18 (International Rescue Committee, 2019b). Before FY18, the lowest 
annual admissions number was in FY02, when 27,131 refugees were admitted in the 
wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. (Nagel, 2016). While the 
refugee populations (nationalities) admitted to the U.S. post-9/11 have changed, and new 
security procedures have been implemented (Barkdull et al., 2012, p. 108), there has been 
no significant legislation to address refugee resettlement in the U.S. since the Refugee 
Act, mainly due to political polarization and inability to work ‘across the aisle’ (Magner, 
2016, p. 187). 
Partisanship in Immigration and Refugee Policy 
 While Americans have historically favored limited immigration (Fussell, 2014), 
the link between partisanship and attitudes toward immigration policy has grown stronger 
over time, as immigration has become an increasingly politicized issue. The winners of 
the 2016 elections were among the most hostile toward immigrants in recent U.S. history, 
according to studies by both Holoma and Tavits (2018) and Schmidt (2019). Melkonian-
Hoover and Kellstedt noted that both the United States and Europe are experiencing 
right-wing populist responses to immigration that frame immigrants as outsiders or 
“others” (2019, p. 51). 
Fears about immigrants have been a theme throughout U.S. history as new 
immigrant groups would arrive, often presenting as right-wing populist responses (Jiang 
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& Erez, 2018; Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 52). In the 1820s – 1850s, 
German and Irish, particularly Irish Catholic, immigrants were the “others” that populist 
movements opposed (Finley & Esposito, 2020, p. 181), including the Republican Party, 
which opposed Irish Catholic immigration (Gratton, 2018, p. 131). Republican strategy 
shifted in the 1860s to promoting immigration as they sought both to increase votes 
among existing immigrant communities and to promote immigrant labor to employers in 
need of laborers (p. 132). The increase in immigrant labor, however, proved to be 
competition for U.S.-born laborers, and, in the 1880s, Republican strategy shifted again 
to restricting immigration to garner working-class votes (p. 129).  
From the 1890s through the 1920s, southern and eastern European immigrants 
were the targets of “othering” in the United States. “Othering” did not occur only in U.S.-
born communities but was also seen in immigrant communities across the country. 
Norwegian- and Swedish-language newspapers denounced immigration from southern 
and eastern Europe in favor of immigration from northwestern Europe (p. 134). Other 
immigrant communities, including German and Croatian speaking communities, 
published news articles opposing restrictions on immigration from southern and eastern 
Europe (p. 134). This “othering” of eastern Europeans remained through WWII when 
Jews fleeing persecution by the Nazis were denied entry into the United States, and 
quotas limiting eastern European immigration remained in place (Welch, 2014).  
The passage of the INA in 1965 marked not only a break from a focus on national 
origin quotas in immigration policy but also the deepening of party divides on 
immigration. Elimination of quotas that were intended to increase western and northern 
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European immigration to the United States was closely tied to the broader U.S. Civil 
Rights Movement, which framed the INA’s reforms as liberal (Tsai, 2019). When 
President Reagan framed immigration as an economic issue in the 1980s, however, the 
majority of Republican senators supported the admission of immigrants (Jeong et al., 
2011, p. 514). Reagan argued:  
Rather than putting up a fence, why don’t we…make it possible for them to come 
here legally with a work permit and, then, while they’re working here and earning 
here, they pay taxes here. (Johnson, 2018, p. 15) 
Jeong et al. argue that this Republican support was borne out of a Republican Party 
dominated by economic conservatives rather than social conservatives (2011, p. 524). It 
was this economically conservative Republican Party that passed the Immigration 
Reform and Control (1986) (IRCA), which granted amnesty to undocumented 
immigrants present before January 1, 1982, and who had been continuously present in the 
United States since that time, approximately three million people (Jeong et al., 2011, p. 
517). The IRCA provided a means to authorize workers through amnesty while also 
requiring employers to hire only work-authorized employees (p. 517).  
 Between the 1980s and the 2010s, the Republican Party became increasingly 
dominated by social conservatives rather than by economic conservatives (Jeong et al., 
2011, p. 524). In 1990, Congress passed and President George H. W. Bush signed into 
law the Immigration Act of 1990 (1990), which increased overall immigration up to 
700,000 per year for 1992-1994, then 675,000 per year thereafter, created five 
employment-based visas by occupation, created a diversity lottery program to admit 
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nationals from countries with limited immigration to the United States, created 
Temporary Protected Status, created a family-based visa program, and reduced the 
number of relative visas available to temporary workers (Johnson, 2018, pp. 15-16). By 
comparison, when the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (1996) was before Congress, social conservatives in the Republican Party proposed 
amendments to reduce family-based and work-based immigration (Jeong et al., p. 519). 
Because pro-business, economic conservatives in the Republican Party opposed the 
amendments, however, they did not pass (p. 519).  
Polarization on immigration policy maintained a low profile in national politics 
throughout the 1990s (Nagel, 2016). Yet, congressional votes on immigration-related 
measures were the most polarizing of all issues voted on from the early 1990s through the 
mid-2010s (Fennelly et al., 2015). Citing Citrin and colleagues in studies from 1990, 
1997, and 2009, Fussell (2014) noted that Republicans consistently preferred 
restrictionist immigration policies, while Democrats consistently favored more 
expansionist policies (p. 487). In reviewing Senate races from 2010, 2012, and 2014, 
Reny found that Republican candidates were more likely than Democratic candidates to 
make anti-immigrant appeals to gain support (2017, p. 736). Additionally, Reny found 
that Republicans in states with increasing immigrant populations were more likely to 
make anti-immigrant appeals that those in states with low immigrant populations. 
However, this increase was moderated by the size of the voting-eligible immigrant 
population in the candidate’s state (p. 743). While Democratic voters were shown to be 
more likely to support expansionist immigration policies if their community had a large 
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immigrant population (Hawley, 2011), immigrant population growth had no effect on 
Democratic Senate candidates making pro-immigrant appeals in Reny’s study (2017, p. 
742).  
The terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001, had a profound 
impact on American politics. Following the “9/11 attacks”, Muslims and others of Middle 
Eastern descent became the “other” of concern in the United States, facing increased 
scrutiny, particularly for immigrants and refugees (Barkdull et al., 2012; Disney, 2017). 
The 9/11 attacks also allowed socially conservative Republicans to argue that immigrants 
and refugees were a security threat, to take stronger anti-immigration positions, and move 
the party closer to positions that were contrary to the pro-business, economically 
conservative positions of 1986 and 1996 (Jeong et al., 2011, p. 519). 
The civil war in Syria led to the highest level of refugees in recorded history in 
2015 (Walden et al., 2017). With the influx of refugees and immigrants from Syria into 
Europe, the Obama administration announced that it would accept ten thousand Syrian 
refugees into the United States through the USRAP. Republicans quickly expressed 
opposition to Syrian refugee resettlement following the November 2015 terrorist attack in 
Paris, with opposition to Syrian refugees used by Republican presidential primary 
candidates in 2016 to “establish their anti-Muslim, pro-national security, pro-border 
control bona fides” (Nagel, 2016, p. 285). Despite fears following the Paris terrorist 
attack, which was later found not to have been committed by refugees, Democratic voters 
remained united on pro-immigration and pro-refugee issues (Noel, 2016, p. 174). By the 
2016 campaign, Bartles (2018) found that Republicans were united around social and 
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cultural conservatism, with little consideration for the economic conservatism that 
previously defined the party, and Democrats were primarily united around an “activist 
government” while being divided on cultural issues (2018, p. 1483). 
Refugee Policy and the Trump Administration 
Restrictions on immigration in general, as well as on refugees specifically, 
became central to Trump’s campaign, even before he secured the Republican nomination 
(Scribner, 2017, p. 263). Muslim immigrants and refugees, in particular, were highlighted 
as threats to the United States, according to Trump, who also linked immigration to 
criminals and refugees to “terrorists-in-waiting” (Scribner, 2017, p. 265, 327). During his 
campaign as well as after taking office, Trump pointed to refugees as threats to national 
security (Ferwerda et al., 2017), while also arguing that the country could not absorb 
more refugees and that refugees were unwilling to assimilate into American culture. 
(Kerwin, 2018). Trump’s opposition to the USRAP, however, is part of a broader 
opposition to immigration (Kerwin, 2018), as demonstrated by orders issued early in his 
administration. 
One week after taking office, Trump issued his first executive order impacting the 
USRAP. Executive Order No. 13,769, commonly referred to as “the Muslim ban” 
(Ferwerda et al., 2017; Fullerton, 2017), on January 27, 2017, banned entry into the 
United States of all citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries for 90 days, 
suspended all refugee resettlement for 120 days, suspended Syrian refugee resettlement 
indefinitely, reduced the FY17 admissions ceiling from 110,000 to 50,000, and stated that 
the USRAP would give preference to religious minorities once refugee resettlement 
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resumed (Executive Order No. 13,769). The Trump administration based its authority to 
issue the executive order on § 212(f) of the INA which reads, in part: 
Whenever the president finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens 
into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, 
may by proclamation, and for such a period as he shall deem necessary, suspend 
the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or 
impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate 
(Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012)). 
More than 50 legal challenges were filed against Executive Order No. 13,769 (Scribner, 
2017, p. 266), with multiple temporary restraining orders issued by January 28, 2017, and 
a nationwide temporary restraining order issued on January 30, 2017, in State of 
Washington v. Trump (2017). With the nationwide restraining order in place, refugees, 
including Syrian refugees, continued to be resettled in the United States over the next five 
weeks (Fullerton, 2017). 
On March 6, 2017, Trump rescinded Executive Order No. 13,769 and issued 
Executive Order No. 13,780 in its place. Similar to the order that it replaced, Executive 
Order No. 13,780, commonly referred to as “the Muslim ban 2.0” (Fullerton, 2017), 
suspended refugee resettlement for 120 days, suspended all entry from six Muslim-
majority countries for 90 days, and lowered the admissions ceiling from 110,000 to 
50,000 (Executive Order No. 13,780, 2017). Like Executive Order No. 13,769 before it, 
more than 50 lawsuits were filed against Executive Order No. 13,780 (Fullerton, 2017), 
and like the previous order, a temporary restraining order was issued against Executive 
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Order No. 13,780, this time in the case of International Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump (2017). The Trump administration appealed the International Refugee Assistance 
Project (IRAP) decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the lower 
court’s decision. The Trump administration, again, appealed the decision. The Supreme 
Court issued an unsigned per curiam opinion on June 26, 2017 in Trump v. International 
Refugee Assistance Project, et al. (2017), allowing many of the provisions of Executive 
Order No. 13,780 to move forward, including the 120-day ban on refugee admissions to 
the U.S., excepting those refugees with close family connections in the United States who 
were allowed entry during those 120 days. This 120-day suspension of most refugee 
admissions through the USRAP lasted into the following fiscal year. For FY18, the 
admissions ceiling was set by the Trump administration at 45,000 the lowest refugee 
admissions ceiling since the passage of the Refugee Act (International Rescue 
Committee, 2017). In FY19, the admissions ceiling was lower, still, set at 30,000 
(International Rescue Committee, 2019b, p. 1). The UNHCR would go on to report that 
2019 set new records of refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2021b).  
Factors Affecting Partisanship and Refugee/Immigration Policy 
 As recently as 2014, the literature on immigration policy held that “[i]mmigration 
policy is not generally viewed as the nation’s most important problem” (Hajnal & Rivera, 
2014, p. 775). By 2018, however, a Gallop Poll showed that “immigration” tied with 
“dissatisfaction with government” as the “most important problem facing the country” for 
Republicans (Reinhart, 2018). Strong opposition to refugee admissions and immigration 
was central to the Trump campaign in 2016, with support for Trump showing substantial 
43 
 
increases among those with anti-immigrant attitudes (Lachman, 2019; Manza & Crowley, 
2018, p. 32; Sides et al., 2018). Trump framed immigrants and refugees as the other 
preventing America from being “great” (Young, 2017, p. 218). This echoed populist 
campaigns in Europe that focused on a “glorious past” and the uncertainty of the future to 
other immigrants and gained support among voters (Saldaña et al., 2018, p. 793). While 
Republican lawmakers and members of the Republican political elite opposed Trump 
(Sides et al., 2018), at least during the presidential primary, Johnson (2018) argued that 
he generally reflected the existing opinions among rank file Republican voters (p. 16). 
 Many scholars have noted the increasing partisanship and polarization in U.S. 
politics (Drometer & Méango, 2017; Fennelly et al., 2015; Fussell, 2014; Kaufmann et 
al., 2012). Not only do political parties shape the opinions of the public, often functioning 
as “aggregators” of political and policy information (Pearson-Merkowitz et al., 2015, p. 
313), but public attitudes also shape the behavior of policymakers (Adida et al., 2019). 
While party preferences affect the public’s attitudes towards immigration, so too does the 
attitude of the native-born public affect the party’s responses to immigration (Homola & 
Tavits, 2018).  
 Given the impact of the public’s opinion on party positions, it is relevant to 
review the literature examining reasons why individuals voted for Trump and how these 
reasons fit within the party’s history. Themes in the literature explanation voting for 
Trump include populism, Islamophobia, economic grievances, and racism/ethnocentricity 
with particular attention to White Evangelical voters (Gest et al., 2018; Kaufmann et al., 
2012; Tsai, 2019; Tucker et al, 2019; Whitehead et al., 2018). Populism is always against 
44 
 
something (Biegon, 2019, p. 520), and Trump’s populism often frames the people against 
immigrants as their adversaries. Magcamit (2017) argues that Trump was elected by 
“people who felt that they had become strangers in their own land” (p. 16) who were not 
able to achieve the American dream and often found immigrants to be the reason 
(Magcamit, 2017). 
Islamophobia  
For some Americans, Muslim refugees and immigrants to the United States pose 
economic, security, and cultural threats (Breshnahan et al., 2018, p. 564). In September 
2015, the world woke up to images of a Syrian toddler who had washed ashore a beach in 
Turkey after drowning in the Mediterranean as his family was fleeing war (Richard, 
2019). Shortly after, Obama announced his intention to increase the admission of Syrian 
refugees, only to have public support waiver following the terrorist attack in Paris in 
November 2015 (Nagel, 2016). The Trump campaign capitalized on the fear generated by 
the Paris attack the stoke negative attitudes toward refugees and immigrants (Saldaña, 
2018, p. 793).  
During the campaign, Trump suggested creating a database to track Muslims in 
the United States., banning all foreign Muslims from entering the United States, and 
characterized Muslims as likely to commit acts of terror (Doucerain et al., 2018, p. 225; 
Magcamit, 2017, p. 18). Trump was not alone in this framing of Muslim refugees. 
Candidate Ben Carson referred to Syrian refugees as “rabid dogs” while Trump referred 
to them as “Trojan horses” for terrorism (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017, p. 87). Trump would 
make similar statements later, when he referred to “unknown Middle Easterners” 
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traveling as part of an immigrant caravan from Central America to the southern border of 
the U.S. (Béland, 2020, p. 171). These statements echo WWII-era concerns that Nazis or 
Nazi supporters may be hiding among Jewish refugee groups and Cold War-era concerns 
that communists may be hiding among those fleeing persecution in communist countries. 
Multiple studies conducted in 2016 and 2017 showed that Republicans, 
conservatives, and Trump-supporters were significantly less likely to support Syrian 
refugees than other U.S. adults (Newman, 2018, p. 776). Having a Republican voting 
record has also been associated with support for policies hostile toward Muslim 
immigrants, including support for reducing the number of Syrian refugees admitted to the 
U.S. (Doucerain et al., 2018, p. 235). Following Trump’s efforts to restrict refugees from 
the Middle East and prioritize Christian refugees (Schmidt, 2019), one poll showed that 
73% of Republicans agreed that “banning people from Muslim countries is necessary to 
prevent terrorism,” while only 19% of Democrats agreed (p. 225). While anti-Muslim 
bias is significantly lower among Democrats, non-Whites, and non-Christians, 
Americans, overall, preferred Syrian refugees who are female, high-skilled, English-
speaking, and Christian (Adida et al., 2019). 
Economic Anxiety 
One theory for Trump’s success is that his economic rhetoric gained support 
among economically struggling segments of the public (Manza & Crowley, 2018). Gest 
et al. have shown that support for Trump among Republicans is related to perceived 
economic deprivation compared to others (2018, p. 1710). Trump frames immigrants as 
taking jobs from U.S.-born workers and lowering overall wages (Finley & Esposito, 
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2020; Magcamit, 2017). While immigrants and U.S.-born Americans tend to compete for 
different low-skilled jobs rather than the same low-skilled jobs (Finley & Esposito, 2020, 
p. 190), a sense of powerlessness amid economic struggles has led working-class and 
low-skilled workers to support Trump (Gest et al., 2018, p. 1697). 
This sense of powerlessness has led not only to support for Trump among 
Republican voters but has also led many working-class Whites to leave the Democratic 
Party (Gest et al., 2018). Continued upward economic mobility and the protections 
provided by union membership were once core to White working-class support of the 
Democratic Party (Reny et al., 2019, p. 97). Losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector have 
disproportionately impacted middle class and low-skilled workers (Gest et al., 2018), 
stunting upward mobility and reducing union membership (Reny et al.), and these losses 
have led many working-class Whites to leave the Democratic Party and support Trump 
(p. 1697). Economic concerns, along with racial matters, led to vote switching in 2016, 
comparable to the Southern realignment following the Civil Rights Movement (Reny et 
al., 2019, p. 109). 
Racism and Ethnocentricity 
An alternative view is that Trump was able to galvanize existing racist and anti-
immigrant sentiments to his advantage in the campaign (Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 29). 
Analysis by Sides et al. showed that dominant factors in supporting Trump included 
concerns about liberalism and “racial and ethnic out-groups,” but not economic concerns 
(2018, p. 148). Concerns about liberalism were also found to be less significant than fears 
of “racial and ethnic out-groups” (p. 148). This may be because many White Americans 
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view race, and by extension immigration, as a “zero-sum” scenario in which gains for any 
one group mean losses for another group (Wilkins & Kaiser, as cited in Major et al., 
2018, p. 932). 
Trump tapped into this anti-immigrant sentiment and into bias against racial, 
ethnic, and religious minorities groups, using “us versus them” rhetoric that resulted in 
“othering” immigrant groups and playing to fears that White Americans will lose to 
immigrants (Breshnahan et al., 2018; Disney, 2017; Heyer, 2018). Multiple studies have 
drawn connections between attitudes toward immigrants and refugees and predispositions 
to ethnocentrism and prejudice (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, p. 775). Among those most likely 
to respond to ethnic or racial appeals from candidates or lawmakers in the United States 
are Republicans (Sides et al., 2018, p. 137). 
Shifts in the racial makeup of the United States and shifts toward more significant 
percentages of the U.S. population being immigrants have been used in political rhetoric 
to play into anxieties about American cultural identity and White dominance in American 
culture (Gest et al., 2018, p. 1697; Jiang & Erez, 2018, p. 9). Studies in Europe have 
shown a direct link between the size of a country’s immigrant population and support in 
that country for right-wing parties (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, p. 774). Over the past half-
century, the United States has become increasingly diverse, with Latinx immigrants 
representing the largest minority group in the country. In contrast, the White population 
has fallen from around 90% to 65% of the U.S. population (p. 773). During those same 
years, the U.S. immigrant population grew from 9.7 million in 1960, representing 5.4% 
of the U.S. population, to 44.4 million in 2017, representing 13.6% of the population 
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(Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). Immigrants as a percentage of the U.S. population 
was at its lowest in the 1960s-1970s, however (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). From the 
1860s through the 1920s, the immigrant population fluctuated between 13.2% and 14.8% 
of the overall U.S. population, only to drop between the 1930s and 1970s before 
increasing again in the 1980s (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.; Young, 2017, p. 219). Hajnal & 
Rivera (2014) argued that large-scale immigration has partisan consequences for Whites 
in America, and partisan choices are linked to racial attitudes in the United States (p. 
774).  
 Manza and Crowley (2018) noted that the partisan ethnonationalism seen in the 
2016 presidential campaign is reminiscent of the southern White response to the 
Democratic Party in the 1960s (p. 30). Those who did not believe that they benefited 
from the liberal policies of the Civil Rights Act (1964) or the changes to immigration 
quotas reacted negatively to the “others” who they perceived to be receiving benefits that 
they did not, including ethnic and religious minorities, women, immigrants, and refugees 
(Magcamit, 2017, p. 16). After the passage of the Civil Rights Act, southern Democrats 
for whom race was an important issue left the Democratic Party and joined the 
Republican conservatives (Jeong, et at., 2011, p. 513). This “southern realignment” (Hill, 
& Tausanovich, 2018), or large-scale movement from affiliation with the Democratic 
Party to the Republican Party, increased the number of social conservatives among 
Republicans. Growing numbers of Republican caucuses passed from business 
conservatives to social conservatives between the 1960s and the 2000s (Jeong et al., 
2011, p. 513). 
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 According to Post (2017), the Republican Party has been mostly White, middle-
class, suburban, and professional since the 1960s (p. 100). During the 2016 election 
cycle, however, this capitalist group was replaced by a what Post called a “radical, right-
wing, middle-class insurgency” (2017, p. 100). Reny et al. argued that this was not only 
working-class White voters but also non-working-class White voters who switched their 
votes to the Republican Party in 2017 based on racial and immigration-related positions 
(2019, p. 92). While party-switching has been closely associated with views on 
immigration policy (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 60), evidence also shows 
that White Americans view the Democratic Party as a party of and for minorities, while 
seeing the Republican Party as a party for Whites (Reny et al., 2019, p. 95).  
 By the 2016 election, the Democratic Party was seen by many Republicans as a 
means for non-Whites (minorities, immigrants, refugees, etc.) to “jump the line” over 
White Americans (Hochschild, 2016, as cited in Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 30). Factors 
affecting how the Democratic Party is seen include the growing Latinx support, the 
public face of elected minority and Latinx representatives, the majority of whom are 
Democrats, and the decreasing proportion of the Democratic Party made up for White 
Americans (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, pp. 715-716). Obama’s election was also significant, 
in that the Democratic Party had not only pushed for civil rights for minorities during the 
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s but had also seen a Black man elected to the 
presidency (Reny et al., 2019, p. 94). In all, studies have shown a stronger relationship 
between vote switching to Trump and measures of racial and immigration attitudes than 
with economic fears (p. 108). 
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White Evangelicalism  
In the United States, political party affiliation is associated with one’s church, 
denomination, and place of residence (Kaufmann et al., 2012, p. 54). White Evangelical 
to Republican Party affiliation in 2011 was 2:1 and had risen to 4:1 by 2018 (Melkonian-
Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 60). While views on immigration are shaped by multiple 
factors, not only religion or theology, Whites affiliated with Evangelical churches were 
found to have the most conservative positions on immigration policy than any other U.S. 
ethnoreligious group (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, pp. 50-51). Disney (2017) 
noted that this may be because they are less likely to be immigrants themselves or to have 
parents who are immigrants; 73% of U.S. Evangelicals have an immigration status of a 
third-generation or higher (p. 69). 
 The idea of Christian nationalism also affects political affiliations in the United 
States. Studies of American identity have shown strong associations between being 
American and being White and Christian (Heyer, 2018, pp. 153-154). Christian 
nationalism is the belief that the United States was founded as a Christian nation (Barrett-
Fox, 2018). This belief has led to a tradition among many conservative Evangelicals that 
White Christians built the United States and that immigrants are outsiders or even 
enemies of this tradition (Whitehead et al., 2018, p. 146). For many right-wing 
Evangelical Christians, there is also a belief that the United States is abandoning its 
Christian heritage, making it vulnerable to losing the special blessings and protection that 
God has granted the country (Barrett-Fox, 2018, p. 506). One study by Whitehead et al. 
(2018) pointed to the belief that the United States is a Christian nation and belief in 
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Christian nationalism as a basis for supporting Trump (p. 148), as Trump promised to 
protect the country’s Christian heritage (Barrett-Fox, 2018, p. 518). 
 While Evangelicals are often portrayed solely as a right-wing group, there is, in 
fact, a diverse range of beliefs among Evangelicals, ranging from what Melkonian-
Hoover and Kellstedt (2019) referred to as “right-wing populist” to “liberal 
internationalist” (p. 50). Right-wing populist Evangelicals have had long-standing 
nationalist worries related to national security and racial and cultural shifts in the United 
States. In contrast, liberal internationalists have had a focus on global missions and 
development, addressing issues that include human trafficking, HIV/AIDS treatment, 
refugee resettlement, and immigration reform (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, pp. 
50-51, 52). This bifurcation in Evangelical beliefs can be seen going back to the 1800s 
when conservative protestants pushed against increasing Catholic immigration and for 
restrictions on immigration from China and other Asian countries (p. 52), while more 
liberal protestants were among the prominent opponents to the passage of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act and were active in advocating for its repeal (p. 52). 
 These different strains of Evangelical thought were again seen in 2015, early in 
the presidential primary race, and when many Americans became aware of the Syrian 
refugee crisis. Many religious leaders, including Evangelical religious leaders, made 
faith-based arguments for bringing more Syrian refugees to the United States (Newman, 
2018, p. 775). The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) and World Relief, NAE’s 
development organization, were outspoken proponents of increasing Syrian refugee 
resettlement, as well as supporters of immigration, refugee resettlement, and 
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comprehensive immigration reform (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 56). In 
2013, the NAE had founded the Evangelical Immigration Table (EIT) to support 
comprehensive immigration reform, uniting immigrant families, ensuring safe borders, 
and promoting comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level (Melkonian-
Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 56). In a review of 59 U.S. Evangelical denominations, 17 
signed onto the EIT, 14 did not sign but made positive or supportive statements about the 
EIT, 28 did not comment the EIT, and no Evangelical denomination made negative 
comments about the EIT (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 55). 
 White Evangelical leaders in support of refugee resettlement and immigration 
have been largely unsuccessful in winning over Evangelical laity. In 2016, only 31% of 
White Evangelicals supported resettling Syrian refugees in the U.S., despite support 
among Evangelical leaders (Newman, 2018, p. 776). Those with higher othering attitudes 
towards refugees and Muslims are also more likely to identify as Christian (Disney, 2017, 
pp. 68-69), and White Evangelicals are among the most anti-refugee groups in the U.S. 
(Barrett-Fox, 2018, p. 508). Clergy have shown a limited ability to influence Evangelical 
laity, who may be more influenced by peers, informal gatherings, or political affiliations 
(Newman, 2018, p. 776). 
Gaps in the Literature  
 There are several related gaps in the literature I addressed in this study. The first 
gap is in presidential action versus Congressional action. Much of the literature addresses 
legislation enacted by Congress, examining motivations for legislation, results of 
legislation, and partisan voting records on immigration laws (Akbari & MacDonald, 
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2014; Brown & Scribner, 2014; Fussell, 2014; Kerwin, 2018; Martin & Ferris, 2017; 
Steil & Vasi, 2014; Teitelbaum, 1980; Triadafilopoulos, 2010; Welch, 2014; Zolberg, 
1998). Refugee admissions to the United States, however, is based on presidential 
determination, rather than on Congressional legislation. Although sources have reviewed 
the Trump administration’s executive actions related to refugee admissions, these have 
addressed executive orders (Breshnahan et al., 2018; Brown & Brown, 2017; Doucerain 
et al., 2018; Fullerton, 2017; Gostin, 2017; Kerwin, 2018; Richard, 2019; Schmidt, 2019; 
Scribner, 2017) with little attention to annual admissions determinations. The results of 
this study show the effects of political party affiliation on the unique process of refugee 
admissions determinations by presidents, rather than Congressional legislation or 
executive orders. 
 A second gap in the literature is between political rhetoric on refugee policy and 
the implications of that rhetoric on refugee admissions. Extant research discusses political 
rhetoric, both by candidates and by elected officials, with particular attention to recent 
election cycles (Fussell, 2014; Gratton, 2018; Homola & Tavits, 2018; Melkonian-
Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019; Schmidt, 2019; Tsai, 2019). While attention is paid to 
fulfilling campaign promises related to immigrant or refugee policy, specifically in the 
case of Trump’s election in 2016, little attention has been paid to the relationship 
between rhetoric and legislation on immigration policy. Even less attention has been 
given to refugee policy or rhetoric’s impact on refugee admissions determinations. 
Knowing that campaign and political rhetoric does not necessarily indicate policy choice 
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(Callander & Wilkie, 2007; Panova, 2017), this study addressed this gap by looking 
beyond rhetoric and promises to actual refugee admissions decisions. 
 As discussed by both Adida et al. (2019) and Homola and Tavits (2018), the 
opinion of the electorate is as important as the positions of the political elite, as each 
impact the other. While research has shown that politicians’ positions and behavior on 
immigration policy (Homola & Tavits, 2018), researchers have not looked at refugee-
specific policy, nor have they examined the impact of the public’s opinion on the 
president’s annual refugee admissions determinations. The third gap is between the pro- 
or anti-refugee sentiment of voters on the actions on refugee admissions taken by the 
politicians they elect to office. Although scholars have detailed the impact of voter 
opinion on the policy positions taken by elected officials, this study looked at the actions 
taken by elected officials once they have been elected to office. 
The final gap in the literature I addressed in this study is the focus in recent 
literature on the refugee policy and admissions decisions of the Trump administration 
with little focus on the history of refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee 
Act in 1980. With Executive Order No. 13,769 (2017) used to lower the refugee 
admissions ceiling in FY17 from 110,000 to 50,000, Trump took a dramatic step that 
garnered significant attention (Ferwerda et al., 2017; Fullerton, 2017; Kerwin, 2018; 
Scriber, 2017). Scholars looking at earlier refugee policy (Barkdull et al., 2012; Brown & 
Scriber, 2014; Bruno, 2015; Fennelly et al., 2015; Gonzalez Benson, 2016; Magner, 
2016; Scribner, 2017; Vialet, 1999) have largely focused on legislative policy, rather than 
refugee admissions determinations. These studies have also failed to examine partisan 
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trends in refugee admissions, leaving open the question of whether the current political 
divisions related to refugee admissions are part of a historical partisan trend or an 
anomaly under the current administration. This study examined the effect of partisan 
affiliation on refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which 
highlight trends by party affiliation and place the refugee admissions determinations of 
the Trump administration within a broader historical context. 
Summary and Conclusions  
 Refugees are a subset of the larger populations of immigrants; as such, partisan 
positions on broad immigration policy, as well as specific refugee policy, are salient. Late 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century immigration policy focused both on U.S. labor 
needs and on maintaining cultural homogeneity (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; 
Triadafilopoulos, 2010). Congress began addressing immigration for those fleeing 
persecution in the 1880s, although these provisions largely benefited European groups 
while still excluding groups such as the Chinese (Zolberg, 1988). Following WWII, 
Congress passed a series of measures to address the refugee crisis in Europe as well as 
refugees from subsequent conflicts (Brown & Scribner, 2014; Gonzalez Benson, 2016; 
Kerwin, 2018; Martin & Ferris, 2017; Scribner, 2017; Welch, 2014). The passage of the 
Refugee Act of 1980 created a more comprehensive refugee admissions program, 
replacing the patchwork of measures passed to address individual refugee crises (Brown 
& Scribner, 2014) and aligning U.S. law with international law under the Protocols 
Relating to the Status of Refugees in defining a “refugee” as an individual who is outside 
their country of nationality, or for those without a nationality outside of their country of 
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habitual residence, who is unable or unwilling to return to or to avail themselves of the 
protection of that country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.  
While Republican lawmakers have traditionally favored more restrictive 
immigration policies and been more conservative on immigration, positions among 
Democrats have also shifted over time (Johnson, 2018, p. 16; Pearson-Merkowitz et al., 
2015, p. 314). president George H. W. Bush, a Republican, was the president who 
established temporary protected status, also known as TPS, for those fleeing natural 
disasters or wars in their country of nationality until it was safe for them to return 
(Lachman, 2019, p. 16). President Clinton, a Democrat, was the president signed the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which made it easier for 
the federal government to deport undocumented immigrants, even for minor offenses 
(Johnson, 2018, p. 16). These examples demonstrate more moderate positions from both 
Republican and Democratic presidents. Still, over the past quarter-century, party leaders 
and lawmakers have become more distinct, polarized, as well more internally uniform 
(Druckman et al., 2013, p. 57). Trump’s election in 2016 pushed Republican lawmakers 
to more conservative positions on immigration that reflected the positions of the 
Republican electorate (Johnson, 2018, p. 16).  
 This increased polarization among political elites has changed how the electorate 
forms opinions, with voters relying more heavily on partisan positions than substantial 
arguments (Druckman et al., 2013, p. 57). This has created a feedback loop of sorts, in 
which the electorate is influencing the Republican Party toward more restrictive 
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immigration positions while also getting information about immigration from Republican 
elites. Despite that fact that little consideration has been given the differences in types of 
immigrants (undocumented, refugees, asylum-seekers, etc.) in political rhetoric allowing 
for limited in-depth discussion, party preferences remain strongly tied to their attitudes 
toward immigration, with negative views toward immigration and immigrants among 
conservative and right-wing voters (Homola & Tavits, 2018, p. 1749).  
 Trump’s campaign played up economic and cultural fears, particularly among 
White Americans. Support for Trump has been tied to perceived economic deprivation, as 
Trump framed immigrants as taking jobs from American workers while lowering wages 
(Finley & Esposito, 2020; Magcamit, 2017; Manza & Crowley, 2018). These economic 
fears overlap with cultural fears of a racially and ethnically changing nation, as both are 
perceived as being related to downward mobility among White Americans (Manza & 
Crowley, 2018, p. 31). Changes to immigration quotas in the 1960s were closely tied to 
the broader Civil Rights Movement, which shifted immigration to the Unit from western 
European immigrants to those from developing countries (Saldaña et al., 2018, p. 789; 
Tsai, 2019, p. 528). Immigration served to tie together two groups supporting Trump – 
those who feared cultural changes to the United States and those with economic anxieties 
(Tsai, 2019, p. 538).  
 This study addressed multiple gaps in the literature. First, the literature focuses on 
Congressional legislation, rather than on presidential actions. As refugee admissions are 
determined by the president annually, presidential actions are particularly salient in 
discussing refugee policy. Next, the literature addresses political rhetoric related to 
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refugee policy, with particular attention to rhetoric during the 2016 presidential election 
but provides limited insight into how that rhetoric translates into practice. The third gap is 
in the influence of the electorate on legislators, which is discussed in multiple studies. 
These studies, however, have not addressed the extent to which this influence has 
extended to refugee admissions determinations. Lastly, there is a heavy focus on the 
Trump administration’s refugee policy and admissions determinations, with little 
attention to the historical trajectory of refugee admissions. This study focused on 
presidential determination on refugee admissions while considering the moderating effect 
of Congressional partisanship. It placed the Trump administration’s policy within a 
broader framework of refugee admissions decisions since the passage of the Refugee Act 
of 1980. 
Historical institutionalism, first discussed by Steinmo et al. in 1992, is the 
theoretical framework for this study. Historical institutionalism looks both at current 
institutional practices and positions but also the origins of those practices and positions 
(Thelen, 1999), holding that these practices and positions shaped by organizational 
context (Steinmo et al., 1992). Historical institutionalism focuses on gradual 
organizational change rather than punctuated or radical change while holding that radical 
change can result from the accumulation of gradual changes over time (Fioretos, 2011; 
Sorensen, 2015) or external shock (Fioretos, 2011). This study identified whether the 
dramatic reductions in refugee admissions determinations under the Trump 
administration result for incremental organizational change or represent an external shock 
to the Republican position on refugee admissions to the United States. In Chapter 3, I 
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discuss how this study was designed, the methodology for conducting the study, and the 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which the president’s 
political party affiliation affects proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual 
admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions while 
controlling for global refugee totals. I also sought to determine the extent to which these 
effects are moderated by the party affiliations of the House and Senate. In this chapter, I 
discuss the research design and rationale, the study methodology, the data analysis plan, 
and threats to validity. I used a nonexperimental, correlative research design and relied on 
analysis of existing federal data on the admissions ceiling, regional allocations, and 
admissions, as well as UNHCR data on global and regional refugee totals, to examine the 
effect of political party affiliation on refugee admissions. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The RQs and hypotheses for this study were as follows: 
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
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RQ2: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H02: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP. 
Ha2: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP. 
RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on 
USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H03: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional allocations. 
Ha3: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional allocations. 
RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on 
USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H04: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional admissions. 
Ha4: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional admissions. 
RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual 
admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
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H05: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
Ha5: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions 
through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H06: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP. 
Ha6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP. 
RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional 
allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H07: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional allocations. 
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Ha7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional allocations. 
RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional 
admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H08: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional admissions. 
Ha8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional admissions. 
Variables 
 This study included one independent variable, one moderating variable, multiple 
dependent variables, and multiple controlling variables.  
Independent Variable 
 The independent, or explanatory, variable was the political party affiliation of the 
president of the United States. For RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7 the political party 
affiliation of each president who issued the final presidential determinations for FY81-
FY19 was recorded as the independent variable, as the admissions ceiling (RQ1 and 
RQ5) and regional allocations (RQ3 and RQ7) are included in the presidential 
determination. The exception is FY17, in which the final admissions ceiling was set by 
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executive order, rather than presidential determination; for FY17, the party affiliation of 
the president issuing the executive order setting the final admissions ceiling was used.  
For RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8, the political party affiliation of the president who 
held office for all or the majority of FY81-FY19 was recorded as the independent 
variable. In election years, the presidency may pass from one party to another midway 
through the FY on January 20, pursuant to the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1). In such instances, the political party 
affiliation of the president who held office for the majority of the FY (January 20–
September 30) was recorded as the independent variable. 
Moderating Variable 
The moderating variable in this study was the political party affiliation of the 
Senate and House majorities. This variable was represented as Senate majority x House 
majority. For RQ5 and RQ7, the political party affiliations of the Senate and House 
majorities were recorded for the date on which the final presidential determination was 
signed by the president. For RQ6 and RQ8, the affiliation of the party that held the 
majority in the Senate and House for all or most of FY81-FY19 was recorded. In election 
years, when the Senate or House majority may change when newly elected members are 
sworn in (Congressional Research Service, 2018a, p. 6, 2018b, p. 2) in January, pursuant 
to the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 2), the 
party that held the majority in each chamber for the majority of the FY (January–




This study included multiple dependent, or outcome, variables. The dependent 
variable for RQ1 and RQ5 was the admissions ceiling, as set in the final annual 
presidential determination for each FY for FY81-FY19, with the exception of FY17 when 
the final admission ceiling was set by executive order. The dependent variable for RQ2 
and RQ6 was the total refugees admitted during each FY for FY81-FY19, as reported by 
PRM. The dependent variables for RQ3 and RQ7 were regional allocations as set in the 
final annual presidential determination for each FY for FY81-FY19, and the dependent 
variables for RQ4 and RQ8 were regional admissions for each FY for FY81-FY19, as 
reported by PRM.  
Controlling Variables 
This study included multiple controlling variables. The controlling variable for 
RQ1, RQ2, RQ5, and RQ6 was the total number of refugees, globally, as reported by the 
UNHCR. The controlling variables for RQ3, RQ4, RQ7 and RQ8 were the total number 
of global refugees by region, as reported by the UNHCR. The UNHCR reports on global 
refugee numbers on a calendar year basis, with reports issued early- to midyear of the 
following calendar year (UNHCR, 2021a). For RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7, the 
controlling variables represent the global refugee numbers available from the UNHCR at 
the time that the final presidential determination or executive order was issued. For RQ2, 
RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8, the controlling variables represent the global refugee numbers 
available from the UNCHR at the end of the federal FY, which is the calendar year that 




For this quantitative study, I used a nonexperimental correlative design and 
performed secondary data analysis. Secondary data are data that have been collected by 
someone other than the researcher, often by a government, and made available for public 
use (Salkind, 2010). Secondary data analysis was chosen for this study because the 
federal government’s data included the total population of refugees admitted to the 
United States and UNHCR’s data included the total population of known refugees 
worldwide. When the entire population is included in research, more about the population 
can be known as a certainty, which can be preferable to making inferences based on a 
sample of the population (Salkind, 2010).  
A nonexperimental study is one in which the independent variable is not 
manipulated and there are no random group assignments associated with the study 
(Glasofer & Townsend, 2020). As this study involved the use of secondary data, there 
was neither manipulation of variables nor random group assignments, making this study a 
nonexperimental design. This study’s RQs focused on the effect of presidential party 
affiliation on refugee admissions. A correlational research design was appropriate, as 
correlational research is used to measure how factors or variables are related and the 
extent to which the variables change in an identifiable pattern (Privitera, 2017, p. 240). 
Identifying correlations between political party affiliations and refugee admissions 





 The primary target population for this study was refugees who have been admitted 
to the United States through the USRAP from the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 
through FY19. This included refugees who arrived in the U.S. FY81-FY19. According to 
Refugee Council USA (2017), more than 3 million refugees have been resettled in the 
United States between the passage of the Refugee Act and the end of FY16 (p. 1), with 
approximately 95,000 additional refugees resettled between FY17 and FY19 
(International Rescue Committee, 2019a). PRM makes public data on the total population 
of refugees admitted annually through the RPC. As a result of the publicly available data, 
sampling of the refugee population was not required.  
 To control for global and regional refugee numbers, the worldwide refugee 
population was also included in this study. The UNHCR makes public the total 
population of refugees globally as well as by country of nationality and country of first 
asylum. These data are available by calendar year beginning in 1951, with data for each 
year made public early- to midyear the following year (UNHCR, 2021a). This study 
included worldwide and regional UNCHR data from 1979 through 2018. As a result of 
the publicly available data, sampling of the refugee population was not required. 
Additional populations included in this study were presidents who held office 
FY81-FY19 and Senate and House majorities during FY81-FY19. The total population of 
presidents, as well as Senate and House members and majorities, was publicly available, 
and sampling was not necessary.  
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Use of Archival Data 
 I primarily relied on archival data. The archival data included the entire 
population of all groups studied, providing greater confidence in the study’s outcomes 
than a sample (see Salkind, 2010). Data from federal agencies have been shown to have 
high quality and reliability (Salkind, 2010), which is another advantage that the data 
provided. The admissions ceiling and proposed regional allocations are formalized 
annually by presidential determination, pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980. These 
presidential determinations are published in the Federal Register. For this study, 
presidential determinations for each fiscal year from FY81-FY19 were retrieved 
electronically from the Federal Register at www.federalregister.gov or 
www.archives.gov/federal-register, where current and historical publications have been 
digitized and are publicly available.  
 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and USCIS publishes an annual 
Yearbook for Immigration Statistics, available online through the department’s website 
or through USCIS’s History Office and Library website. Data from each yearbook lists 
final admissions ceilings and final regional allocations, identifying any FY in which 
either was changed through use of the unallocated reserve or through presidential 
determination or executive order. Yearbooks for FY81-FY19 were reviewed to detect any 
midyear changes and ensure that final ceilings and regional allocations were used in data 
analysis. 
PRM publishes refugee admissions data online through the RPC at 
www.wrapsnet.org. The data for FY81-FY19 were publicly available and did not require 
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permissions to access. Data from the RPC included annual refugee admissions numbers, 
both in aggregate and by region. For this study, annual admissions totals and annual 
regional admissions were retrieved from the RPC for each FY from FY81-FY19.  
The UNHCR publishes global refugee data online at www.unhcr.org/refugee-
statistics. The data since 1951 were publicly available and did not require permissions to 
access. Data from the UNCHR included total global refugee numbers, as well as by 
region. For this study, annual global refugee totals, annual total refugees by country of 
nationality, and annual total refugees by country of first asylum were retrieved from the 
UNCHR for calendar years 1979-2018. 
The political party affiliations of the president, the Senate majority, and the House 
majority were publicly available through their respective websites (U.S. House, n.d.; U.S. 
Senate, n.d.; White House, n.d.). The political party affiliation of the president for each 
FY from FY81-FY19 was retrieved from the White House’s website, 
www.whitehouse.gov. The Senate majority for each FY from FY81-FY19 was retrieved 
from the Senate’s website, www.senate.gov. The House majority for each FY from 
FY81-FY19 was retrieved from the House’s website, www.house.gov. No permissions 
were required to access the data. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
Presidential Party Affiliation  
Presidential party affiliation was the independent variable for all RQs in this 
study. Presidential party affiliation is defined as the political party with which the elected 
president has affiliated themself. With the exception of George Washington, all U.S. 
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presidents have been affiliated with a political party (Jamison, 2014). The party affiliation 
for each president from FY81-FY19 was identified using publicly available information 
at the White House website. All presidents during that period identified as either a 
Democrat or Republican, and each president had their party affiliation coded as 
“Democrat” or “Republican”. These records were then dummy coded in order to conduct 
regression analysis. For RQ1 and RQ5, the political party affiliation of each president 
who set the final admissions ceiling was recorded as the independent variable. For fiscal 
years in which the admissions ceiling changed midyear (FY88, FY89, FY99, and FY17), 
the party affiliation of the president issuing the final ceiling was used as the independent 
variable for RQ1 and RQ5. 
For RQ3 and RQ7, the political party affiliation of each president who set the 
final regional allocations was recorded as the independent variable. For fiscal years in 
which regional allocations changed midyear through presidential determination (FY88, 
FY89, and FY99), the party affiliation of the president issuing the final regional 
allocations was used as the independent variable for RQ3 and RQ7. For FY88, FY89, and 
FY99, the party affiliation of the president setting the initial regional allocations and the 
party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocations were the same. Only 
for FY17 was the party affiliation of the president setting the initial ceiling and the 
president setting the final ceiling different. For fiscal years in which regional allocations 
changed due to use of the unallocated reserve (FY90, FY91, FY92, FY93, FY94, FY97, 
FY98, FY00, FY01, and FY04), the party affiliation of the president issuing the initial 
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presidential determination was used, as no secondary presidential determination was 
made. 
For RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8, the political party affiliation of the president who 
held office for all or the majority or FY81-FY19 was recorded as the independent 
variable. In election years, when the Presidency may pass from one party to another mid-
way through the fiscal year on January 20, pursuant to the Twentieth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1), the political party affiliation of the 
president who held office for the majority of the fiscal year (January 20–September 30) 
was recorded as the independent variable. 
Senate and House Majority Party Affiliation 
Senate and House majority party affiliation was the moderating variable used in 
RQ5, RQ6, RQ7, and RQ8. Senate and House party affiliation is defined as the political 
party holding the majority of seats in each chamber of Congress, as identified by the 
party affiliation of the Majority Leader in each chamber. The party affiliation of the 
Majority Leaders of the Senate from FY81-FY19 is publicly available on the U.S. Senate 
website. The party affiliation of the Majority Leaders of the House from FY81-FY19 is 
publicly available on the U.S. House of Representatives website. All majorities during 
that period were identified as either a Democrat or Republican, and each Senate and 
House majority had their party affiliation coded as “Democrat” or “Republican”. These 
records were then dummy coded in order to conduct regression analysis. This moderating 
variable was expressed as Senate majority x House majority for regression analysis. 
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For RQ5 and RQ7, the political party affiliations of the Senate and House 
majorities were recorded for the date on which the presidential determination was signed 
by the president, setting the admissions ceiling and regional allocations. For fiscal years 
in which the admissions ceiling changed midyear through presidential determination 
(FY88, FY89, and FY99), the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities at the 
time of the final presidential determination was recorded for RQ5. For fiscal years in 
which the regional allocations changed midyear through presidential determination 
(FY88, FY89, and FY99), the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities at the 
time of the final presidential determination was recorded for RQ7.  
Although presidential determinations require consultation with Congress, the 
executive orders issued in FY17 lowering the admissions ceiling did not require 
Congressional consultation (Bolton & Thrower, 2016, p. 649). For the sake of 
consistency with midyear changes by presidential determination in FY88, FY89, and 
FY99, however, the Senate and House majorities at the time of the Executive Orders was 
recorded for RQ5 for FY17. Unlike the presidential determinations in FY88, FY89, and 
FY90, which modified the regional allocations for the respective FYs, the executive 
orders lowering the FY17 ceiling did not address regional allocations. Therefore, the 
Senate and House majorities at the time of the original FY17 presidential determination 
were recorded for RQ7 for FY17. 
For RQ6 and RQ8, the affiliation of the party that held the majority in the Senate 
and House for all or most of FY81-FY19 was recorded. In election years, when the 
Senate or House majority may change when newly elected members are sworn in 
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(Congressional Research Service, 2018a, p. 6; 2018b, p. 2) in January, pursuant to the 
Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 2), the party 
that held the majority in each chamber for most of the fiscal year (January–September) 
was recorded for the moderating variable. 
Dependent Variables 
This study involved multiple dependent variables, including annual admissions 
ceilings (RQ1 and RQ5), annual total admissions (RQ2 and RQ6), annual regional 
allocations (RQ3 and RQ7), and annual regional admissions (RQ4 and RQ8). 
Admissions Ceiling. The refugee admissions ceiling is the maximum number of 
refugees permitted to enter the United States in a given fiscal year, as set annually by 
presidential determination (Martin & Yankay, 2013). Admissions ceilings were recorded 
in whole numbers for each FY (FY81-FY19). For fiscal years in which the admissions 
ceiling was changed midyear by presidential determination (FY88, FY89, and FY99) or 
by executive order (FY17), the final admissions ceiling for the fiscal year was recorded. 
For those fiscal years in which the federally funded admissions ceiling differed from the 
overall admissions ceiling (FY88-FY95) due to the Private Sector Initiative (PSI) 
launched under the Reagan administration, the federally funded admissions ceiling was 
used. Not only was the PSI program discontinued due lack of interest and limited use 
(Barnett, 2002, p. 164), but the portion of the admissions ceiling designated for PSI was 
often not tied to a specific region and the national and/or regional information for the 
limited number of refugees admitted through the PSI is not available through PRM, 
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making the inclusion of PSI data irrelevant to this study. Exclusion of PSI admissions is 
not uncommon in studies related to U.S. refugee admissions (Teitelbaum, 1998, p. 471).  
Regional Allocations. The regional allocations are the maximum number of 
refugees permitted to enter the United States from specific geographic regions of the 
world in a given fiscal year. These allocations are subsets of the overall admissions 
ceiling (Martin & Yankay, 2013). PRM currently categorizes regions as East Asia, 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Near East & South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, 
and Africa. Regional allocations for each of these categories were recorded in whole 
numbers. In FY90, when PSI designated slots were included in regional allocations, only 
federally funded slots were included. 
“East Asia” has been consistently used as a region since FY83. In FY81 and 
FY82, this region was referred to in presidential determinations as “Asia” and was 
distinguished from the “Near East”, which was also used only in FY81 and FY82. In this 
study, the “Asia” regional allocation in FY81-FY82 was listed as “East Asia”. In FY85-
FY90, “East Asia” included the two subcategories “East Asia – First Asylum” and “East 
Asia – Orderly Departure Program”. Both subsections of “East Asia” were combined for 
FY85-FY90 as “East Asia”. 
“Eastern Europe & Central Asia” has been listed as a region since FY04. In 
FY81-FY82 and FY90-FY92, this region was represented as the two regions of “Eastern 
Europe” and the “Soviet Union”. From FY83-FY89, this was a single region referred to 
as “Soviet Union & Eastern Europe,” which became the “Former Soviet Union & Eastern 
Europe” from FY94-FY96. In FY97-FY99, this region was simply referred to as 
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“Europe”, but in FY00 was divided into “Former Yugoslavia”, “Kosovo Crisis”, and 
“Newly Independent States/Baltics”. In FY01-FY03 and in FY93, this region was 
represented as the two separate regions of “Eastern Europe” and the “Former Soviet 
Union”, before becoming “Eastern Europe & Central Asia” in FY04. Despite the history 
of diverse regional names, Congressional Reports are clear that these regions are now 
represented as “Eastern Europe & Central Asia” (Bruno, 2018, p. 12) and have been 
combined on an annual basis and listed as “Eastern Europe & Central Asia” in this study. 
“Near East & South Asia” has been consistently used as a region since FY83. In 
FY81-82, this region was known as simply as “Near East”. All regional allocations for 
the “Near East” are listed as “Near East & South Asia” in this study. 
“Latin America & Caribbean” has been listed as a region each year except for 
FY85, when only “Latin America” was listed; in this study, “Latin America” was 
included as “Latin America & Caribbean”. In FY81, “Latin America & Caribbean” had 
two subsections, which included “Latin America & Caribbean – Cuba” and “Latin 
America & Caribbean – Other”. Both of these FY81 subsections have been combined 
into “Latin America & Caribbean” for this study. 
“Africa” has been used as a single category in every presidential determination 
since FY81, and no reclassification of previous names for this region were required. 
Total Admissions. Total admissions refer to the total number of refugees 
admitted to the United States in a specific fiscal year. Total refugee admissions numbers 
were retrieved from PRM and recorded as whole numbers. For fiscal years in which 
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refugees were admitted through the PSI program (FY88-FY93), PSI admissions were not 
included in the total refugee admissions in this study. 
Regional Admissions. Regional admissions refer to the total number of refugees 
admitted to the United States from specific regions in a given fiscal year. PRM reports 
regional admissions in the same regional categories as regional allocations were made in 
that fiscal year. Due to the changing names of regions between FY81-FY19, 
reclassifications were required for refugee admissions by region, and these were done in 
the same manner outlined for Regional Allocations, above. Regional admissions were 
retrieved from PRM and recorded as whole numbers. In FY90, when PSI designated slots 
were used for regional admissions, only federally funded admissions were included. 
Controlling Variables 
This study involved multiple controlling variables, including the global refugee 
totals (RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7) and global refugee totals by region (RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, 
and RQ8). 
Global Refugee Totals. Global refugee totals refer to the total number of 
refugees in the world under the UNHCR’s mandate, as published by the UNHCR. The 
UNHCR publishes calendar year data for the previous calendar year early- to midyear the 
following year. Global refugee levels were represented in whole numbers. 
For RQ1 and RQ5, the most recent data available at the time the final admissions 
ceiling was set, generally the year prior to the start of the fiscal year. For FY88, FY89, 
FY99, and FY17, in which the admissions ceiling was modified midyear, UNHCR data 
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from the year overlapping the start of the fiscal year was available and this data was used 
for controlling variables for RQ1 and RQ5. 
For RQ2 and RQ6, the most recent data available by the end of the fiscal year was 
used, which was the calendar year that overlapped the start of the fiscal year. 
Global Refugee Totals by Region. Global refugee populations by region refers 
to the total number of refugees by region, corresponding with the regions outlined by 
PRM, namely East Asia, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Near East & South Asia, Latin 
America & Caribbean, and Africa. Numbers for each region were represented in whole 
numbers. 
The UNHCR’s annual data reports include refugees by country of nationality but 
does not divide refugees into specific regions. In order to categorize refugees by regions 
that correspond to PRM’s regions, each country producing a refugee was designated into 
a specific region. As PRM is a Bureau within the U.S. Department of State, the regional 
designations of countries, as outlined by specific Bureaus overseen by the Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs, were used to categorize countries into the appropriate 
region. For nationalities listed by UNHCR that were not accounted for by one of the 
Bureaus, geographic location and dependency information from the U.S. Department of 
State were reviewed to determine the most appropriate regional categorization.  
For a complete list of countries and areas classified as East Asia, along with 
country-specific operationalization details, see Appendix A. For a complete list of 
countries and areas classified as Eastern Europe & Central Asia, along with country-
specific operationalization details, see Appendix B. For a complete list of countries and 
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areas classified as Near East & South Asia, along with country-specific operationalization 
details, see Appendix C. For a complete list of countries and areas classified as Latin 
America & Caribbean, along with country-specific operationalization details, see 
Appendix D. For a complete list of countries and areas classified as Africa, along with 
country-specific operationalization details, see Appendix E.   
 In addition to the countries of nationality listed for refugees by the UNHCR, 
many refugees were listed as being stateless or having an unknown nationality. Stateless 
individuals are those who “under national laws, [do] not enjoy citizenship – the legal 
bond between a government and an individual – in any country” (U.S. Department of 
State, n.d.i). In order to include the entire global refugee in a specific geographic region, 
an alternative means of categorization was needed for individuals listed as stateless or 
having an unknown nationality. Along with listing the country of nationality in their data 
reports, the UNHCR also lists each refugee’s country of first asylum. Studies show that 
the vast majority of refugees fleeing their country of nationality, or for those without a 
nationality their country of habitual residence, flee to neighboring countries (Van Hear, 
2006, p. 9). Given this tendency to flee to geographically proximate countries, the 
country of first asylum was used to identify the most appropriate regional category for 
refugees with a nationality listed as stateless or unknown. For example, if a refugee’s 
nationality was listed as unknown, but their country of first asylum was identified by the 
UNHCR as Thailand, that refugee was counted as part of East Asia, based on Thailand 
being part of the East Asia region. 
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For RQ3 and RQ7, the most recent data available at the time final regional 
allocations was set, generally the year prior to the start of the fiscal year. For FY88, 
FY89, and FY99, in which regional allocations were modified midyear, UNHCR data 
from the year overlapping the start of the fiscal year was available and this data was used 
as controlling variables for RQ3 and RQ7. 
For RQ4 and RQ8, the most recent data available by the end of the fiscal year was 
used, which was the calendar year that overlapped the start of the fiscal year. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Hierarchical regression analysis was used to explain the effect of the president’s 
political party on refugee admission and moderating effects of the Senate and House 
majorities. Data analysis was completed using the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS), version 25.  
Statistical Tests 
 Hierarchical regression was used to answer all RQs in this study. Hierarchical, or 
sequential, regression is a form of multiple linear regression in which variables are 
entered in separate steps, or “blocks,” and is often used to analyze the moderating effects 
of a variable (IBM, n.d.b). Hierarchical regression identifies variance in a specific 
dependent variable after accounting for all other variables (Kim, 2016, para. 1).This was 
an appropriate statistical test, as RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 sought to identify the 
variance accounted for by presidential party affiliation, after accounting for global 
refugee totals, and R5, RQ6, RQ7, and RQ8 sought to identify the variance accounted for 
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by Senate and House majority party affiliations, after accounting for both global refugee 
totals and presidential party affiliation. 
 For RQ1 and RQ2, global refugee totals were entered into the first block, and 
presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block. The model significance 
was reviewed by examining the F-change (ΔF) significance. If the model was significant 
with a p-value of <0.05, the coefficient of determination, R2, was interpreted. The R2 
change (ΔR2) was particularly significant in this analysis, as it indicates the effect of 
presidential party affiliation, after controlling for global refugee totals. In reviewing the 
coefficients output, the constant, a, and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b, were used 
in the regression equation of Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 for predicting the admissions ceiling and 
total admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee 
totals. 
 For RQ3 and RQ4, global refugee totals by region were entered into the first 
block, and presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block. The model 
significance was reviewed by examining the F-change (ΔF) significance. If the model 
was significant with a p-value of <0.05, the coefficient of determination, R2, was 
interpreted, with specific attention to ΔR2. In reviewing the coefficients output, the 
constant, a, and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b, were used in the regression 
equation of Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 for predicting regional allocations and regional admissions 
by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee totals by region. 
 For RQ5 and RQ6, global refugee totals were entered into the first block, 
presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block, and Senate and House 
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majority party affiliation into the third block as Senate majority x House majority. The 
model significance was reviewed by examining the F-change (ΔF) significance. If the 
model was significant with a p-value of <0.05, the coefficient of determination, R2 for the 
third block was interpreted with specific attention to ΔR2. In reviewing the coefficients 
output, the constant, a, and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b, were used in the 
regression equation of Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2+b3X3 for predicting the admissions ceiling or 
total admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee 
totals, as moderated by the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities. 
 For RQ7 and RQ8, global refugee totals by region were entered into the first 
block, presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block, and Senate and 
House majority party affiliation into the third block as Senate majority x House majority. 
The model significance was reviewed by examining the F-change (ΔF) significance If the 
model was significant with a p-value of <0.05, the coefficient of determination, R2 for the 
third block was interpreted with specific attention to ΔR2. In reviewing the coefficients 
output, the constant, a, and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b, were used in the 
regression equation of Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2+b3X3 for predicting regional allocations and 
regional admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global 




Threats to Validity 
Internal Validity and Credibility 
Credibility and internal validity are ways of considering the extent to which 
research is truthful (Mills et al., 2010, p. 243). Strategies to enhance credibility include 
the use of established research methods, triangulation, addressing sampling bias, and 
examination of previous findings (Shenton, 2004, pp. 64-69). The use of secondary 
analysis of data provided by the federal government and the United Nations is a well-
established and widely accepted method of conducting research (Babbie, 2017; Orzes, et 
al., 2018). Because the entire population of refugees admitted, global refugees, 
presidential majority parties, and Senate and House majority parties were included in this 
study, no sampling took place in which bias could have been present. Triangulation was 
done by comparing annual admissions numbers, in aggregate and by region, using PRM’s 
data and the annual Yearbook for Immigration Statistics; data from annual presidential 
determinations and the annual Yearbook for Immigration Statistics were also 
triangulated. This triangulation identified the years in which secondary presidential 
determinations had been issued and admissions ceilings and regional allocations had been 
adjusted midyear. The conclusions drawn in this study were also compared to findings in 
previous studies and were found to be in line with prior findings; findings are discussed 
in the following chapters.  
Internal validity involves the possibility that the conclusions drawn from the 
results may not reflect what actually occurred (Babbie, 2017, p. 243). The threat to 
internal validity in this study was related to instrumentation, or the manner in which 
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variables were measured (Babbie, 2017, p. 243). PRM’s regional groupings changed over 
time, although current regional designations have remained the same since FY04. For 
each FY (FY81-FY03); however, some level of recategorization of regions was required 
in order to align with current regional groupings. In addition, the UNHCR does not 
designate refugees by region, but by country of nationality only. Consequently, country 
groupings were established to correspond with PRM’s regional categories. These 
groupings were made based on U.S. Department of State regional designations, as PRM 
is part of the department. 
External Validity  
Transferability 
Transferability both related to the generalizability of findings, which are based on 
samples of a population in most studies, to the total population being studied (Babbie, 
2017, p. 245; Shenton 2004, p. 69). This study relied on the entire population of all 
groups being studied, rather than a sample of any of these populations. As a result, there 
are no concerns related to transferability for this study. 
Dependability and Reliability 
Dependability and reliability refer to the ability to achieve the same results if 
another researcher were to duplicate the study (Babbie, 2017, pp. 418-419; Shenton, 
2004, p. 71). Methods that can be employed to increase dependability and reliability 
include clear presentation of the research design and implementation and detailed 
descriptions of operationalization (Shenton 2004, pp. 71-72). In this chapter, I have 
presented a clear description of the sources for each data point collected, the methods of 
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operationalizing the data, and additional descriptions for the data analysis are presented 
in Chapter 4. Sufficient data has been provided to ensure that this research study can be 
duplicated by another researcher. 
Confirmability and Objectivity 
Confirmability and objectivity are both related to the neutrality of the researcher 
in relation to the data (Stumpfegger, 2017) and the distance the researcher is able to keep 
from the study subjects (Shenton, 2004). Triangulation can play an important role in 
confirming objectivity and confirmability (Shenton, 2004, p. 72). Triangulation was 
completed in this study for annual admissions, regional admissions, annual ceilings, and 
regional ceilings. This study secondary data analysis, ensuring that there was no 
interaction between the study subjects and the researcher. In operationalizing the data, 
operational decisions were guided by the definitions and explanations provided by the 
secondary data source to ensure the neutrality of the operational decisions. 
Summary  
 This non-experimental correlative study examined the effect of presidential 
political party affiliation on the admissions ceiling, total admissions, regional allocations, 
and regional admissions after controlling for global refugee totals, and also assessed the 
moderating effect of the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities. 
SPSS was used to conduct hierarchical multiple regression analysis to address the RQs 
presented in this study. Chapter 4 details the data collection undertaken to conduct this 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which the president’s 
political party affiliation affects proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual 
admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions while 
controlling for global refugee totals. I also sought to determine the extent to which these 
effects are moderated by the party affiliations of the House and Senate. In this chapter, I 
discuss the data collection process, provide descriptive statistics of the data, and detail 
results of the data analysis. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The RQs and hypotheses for this study are as follows: 
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
RQ2: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H02: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP. 
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Ha2: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP. 
RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on 
USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H03: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional allocations. 
Ha3: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional allocations. 
RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on 
USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H04: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional admissions. 
Ha4: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional admissions. 
RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual 
admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H05: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
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Ha5: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions 
through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H06: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP. 
Ha6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP. 
RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional 
allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H07: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional allocations. 
Ha7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional allocations. 
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RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional 
admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H08: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional admissions. 
Ha8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional admissions. 
Data Collection 
I obtained IRB approval (no. 12-01-20-0670738) from Walden University in 
December 2020 and collected all preliminary data that month. Political party affiliation 
data included the presidential party affiliation of each president (FY81-FY19) from the 
White House website, the party affiliation of each Senate majority (FY81-FY19) from the 
U.S. Senate website, and the party affiliation of each House majority (FY81-FY19) from 
the U.S. House of Representatives website. Political party affiliation data were available 
for all presidents as well as Senate and House majorities for each year FY81-FY19. Data 
on refugee admissions, both in aggregate and by region, were retrieved from PRM’s RPC 
website at www.wrapsnet.org. Data were available for total and regional refugee 
admissions for all years FY81-FY19. Data on the global refugee totals, global refugee 
totals by country of nationality, and global refugees totals by country of first asylum for 
calendar years 1979-2018 were retrieved from the UNHCR’s Refugee Data Finder 
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website at www.unhcr.org/refugee-satistics. Data were available for total global refugees, 
refugees by country of nationality, and refugees by country of first asylum for all years 
1979-2018. Data on annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, published in the 
presidential determination FY81-FY19, were retrieved from the Federal Register at 
www.federalregister.gov and/or www.archives.gov/federal-register. All presidential 
determinations with admissions ceilings and regional allocations were available for each 
year FY81-FY19. 
After operationalizing the data and conducting data analysis, I noticed that the 
total number of refugee admissions in 3 fiscal years exceeded the admissions ceiling, 
suggesting that a change had been made to the admissions ceiling subsequent to the 
ceiling set in the presidential determination at the start of the fiscal year. I submitted a 
request to amend the data collection plan to the IRB to include review of USCIS’s 
Yearbook for Immigration Statistics FY81-FY19, to review final admissions ceilings and 
regional allocations on February 12, 2021; the request was approved the same day. 
Between February 13-14, 2021, I retrieved all USCIS Yearbooks for Immigration 
Statistics FY81-FY19 from U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s website (FY96-
FY19) or from USCIS’s Historical Office and Library (FY81-FY95).  
Yearbooks for FY88, FY89, and FY99 indicated that admissions ceilings were 
increased during the FY. I retrieved each updated presidential determination (FY88, 
FY89, and FY99) indicating the increased admissions ceilings and adjusting regional 
allocations from the Federal Register. Yearbooks for FY90, FY91, FY92, FY93, FY94, 
FY97, FY98, FY00, FY01, and FY04 showed adjusted regional allocations through the 
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distribution of the unallocated reserve to specific regions, not through the issuance of a 
secondary presidential determination. The executive order issued in FY17 lowering the 
admissions ceiling was identified during the literature review and was the source of 
FY17’s final admissions ceiling number. After collecting data for final admissions 
ceilings and regional allocations, data were operationalized, as outlined in Chapter 3, and 
data analysis was completed.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The independent variable in RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7 was the political party 
affiliation of the president who set the final admission ceiling (RQ1 and RQ5) and final 
regional allocations (RQ3 and RQ7) for the FY (see Table 1). The moderating variables 
were the political party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities at the time the final 
admissions ceiling (RQ5) and the final regional allocations (RQ7) were set. As shown in 
Table 1, 17 of 39 (43.5%) of admission ceilings were set by presidents affiliated with the 
Democratic Party, while 18 of 39 (46.2%) of regional allocations were set by presidents 
affiliated with the Democratic Party, resulting from the FY17 executive order issued by 
Trump lowering the admissions ceiling without addressing regional allocations. At the 
time that admissions ceilings and regional allocations were finalized, 20 (51.3%) of 
Senate majorities were Republican and 19 (48.7%) were Democratic. House majorities at 
the time admissions ceilings and regional allocations were finalized were 48.7% (19) 





Final Admission Ceilings and Regional Allocations by Party Affiliation 
 Presidential party Senate majority party House majority party 
FY81 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
FY82 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY83 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY84 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY85 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY86 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY87 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY88 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY89 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY90 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY91 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY92 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY93 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY94 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
FY95 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
FY96 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY97 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY98 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY99 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY00 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY01 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY02 Republican Democrat Republican 
FY03 Republican Democrat Republican 
FY04 Republican Republican Republican 
FY05 Republican Republican Republican 
FY06 Republican Republican Republican 
FY07 Republican Republican Republican 
FY08 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY09 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY10 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
FY11 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
FY12 Democrat Democrat Republican 
FY13 Democrat Democrat Republican 
FY14 Democrat Democrat Republican 
FY15 Democrat Democrat Republican 
FY16 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY17 – regional allocations Democrat Republican Republican 
FY17 – admissions ceiling Republican Republican Republican 
FY18 Republican Republican Republican 
FY19 Republican Republican Republican 
 
Note. Regional allocations for FY17 were set under the Obama administration (Democrat) and were not 
addressed in the executive order setting the final admission ceiling for FY17 under the Trump 
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administration (Republican); this is the only fiscal year in which the admissions ceiling and regional 
allocations were set by different administrations. 
The independent variable for RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8 was the political party 
affiliation of the president who held office for all or the majority of the FY, with the 
Senate and House majority party affiliations for the party holding the majority of the 
chamber for all or most of the FY serving as the moderating variable for RQ6 and RQ8. 
As shown in Table 2, Republican presidents held office for 51.3% (20) of FYs (FY81-
FY19), with Democratic presidents holding office for 48.7% (19). Republicans held the 
Senate majority in 53.8% (21) of FYs, with Democrats holding the majority in 46.2% 
(18). Republicans held the House majority for 51.3% (20) of FYs, with Democrats 
holding the majority in 48.7% (19).  
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Table 2  
 
Party Affiliations During the Fiscal Year of Admissions 
 Presidential party Senate majority party House majority party 
FY81 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY82 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY83 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY84 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY85 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY86 Republican Republican Democrat 
FY87 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY88 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY89 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY90 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY91 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY92 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY93 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
FY94 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
FY95 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY96 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY97 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY98 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY99 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY00 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY01 Republican Democrat Republican 
FY02 Republican Democrat Republican 
FY03 Republican Republican Republican 
FY04 Republican Republican Republican 
FY05 Republican Republican Republican 
FY06 Republican Republican Republican 
FY07 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY08 Republican Democrat Democrat 
FY09 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
FY10 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
FY11 Democrat Democrat Republican 
FY12 Democrat Democrat Republican 
FY13 Democrat Democrat Republican 
FY14 Democrat Democrat Republican 
FY15 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY16 Democrat Republican Republican 
FY17 Republican Republican Republican 
FY18 Republican Republican Republican 





Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7 are 
found in Table 3. The dependent variable for RQ1 and RQ5 was the final refugee 
admissions ceiling (M = 86941.03, SD = 31590.078), which ranged from a high of 
217,000 in FY81 to a low of 30,000 in FY19. The dependent variables for RQ3 and RQ7 
were the regional allocations (RA) for each of the following regions: East Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and 
Africa. Regional allocations for East Asia (M = 30824.36, SD = 31280.316) ranged from  
Table 3  
Annual Ceiling and Regional Allocations 
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
Annual Ceiling 39 30000 217000 86941.03 31590.078 
RA – East Asia 39 4000 168000 30824.36 31280.316 
RA – Eastern Europe & Central Asia 39 1000 64300 23943.59 21544.761 
RA – Near East & South Asia 39 2500 40000 13835.90 12555.545 
RA – Latin America & Caribbean 39 1000 9000 3865.90 1640.168 
RA – Africa 39 2000 35000 12138.46 8429.916 
      
 
a high of 168,000 in FY81 to a low of 4,000 in FY02, FY03, and FY19. Regional 
allocations for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 23943.59, SD = 21544.761) ranged 
from a high of 64,300 in FY92 to a low of 1,000 in FY14 and FY15. Regional allocations 
for Near East and South Asia (M = 13835.90, SD = 12555.545) ranged from a high of 
40,000 in FY17 to a low of 2,500 in FY05. Regional allocations for Latin America and 
Caribbean (M = 3865.90, SD = 1640.168) ranged from a high of 9,000 in FY94 to a low 
of 1,000 in FY84 and FY85. Regional allocations for Africa (M = 12138.46, SD = 
8429.916) ranged from a high of 35,000 in FY17 to a low of 2,000 in FY89. 
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Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8 are 
found in Table 4. The dependent variable for RQ2 and R6 was total number of refugees 
admitted annually (M = 74031.03, SD = 29583.081), which ranged from a high of 
159,252 in FY81 to a low of 22,517 in FY18. The dependent variables for RQ4 and RQ8 
were the regional admissions for each of the following regions: East Asia, Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa.  
Table 4  
Total Admissions and Regional Admissions 
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
Total Annual Admissions 39 22517 159252 74031.03 29583.081 
East Asia Admissions 39 1724 131139 27423.23 25594.904 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 
Admissions 
39 580 64312 21650.21 20788.995 
Near East & South Asia Admissions 39 2801 38280 11901.36 11439.865 
Latin America & Caribbean Admissions 39 131 7629 2686.8 1826.111 
Africa Admissions 39 1322 31624 10369.38 7964.187 
 
Regional admissions for East Asia (M = 27423.23 SD = 25594.904) ranged from a high 
of 131,139 in FY81 to a low of 1,724 in FY03. Regional admissions for Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (M = 21650.21, SD = 20788.995) ranged from a high of 64,312 in FY92 
to a low of 580 in FY13. Regional admissions for Near East and South Asia (M = 
11901.36, SD = 11439.865) ranged from a high of 38,280 in FY09 to a low of 2801 in 
FY19. Regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 2686.8, SD = 
1826.111) ranged from a high of 7629 in FY95 to a low of 131 in FY86. Regional 
admissions for Africa (M = 10369.38, SD = 7964.187) ranged from a high of 31,624 in 
FY16 to a low of 1322 in FY86. 
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Descriptive statistics for the controlling variables in RQ1, RQ2, RQ5, and RQ6 
are found in Table 5. The controlling variable in RQ1 and RQ2 was the total number of 
global refugees as reported by the UNHCR (M = 12519568.49, SD = 3080538.951) most 
recently available at the time the annual ceiling was finalized, which ranged from a high 
of 19,940,568 in FY19 to a low of 6,279,912 in FY81. The dependent variables for RQ5 
and RQ6 were the regional number of refugees reported by the UNHCR most recently 
available at the time the annual ceiling was finalized for each of the following regions: 
East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America 
and Caribbean, and Africa. Regional refugee totals for East Asia (M = 929942.82, SD = 
184007.398) ranged from a high of 1,753,408 in FY19 to a low of 669,494 in FY88.  
Table 5 
Total Global and Regional Refugees at the Finalization of Admissions Ceilings and 
Regional Allocations 
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
Total Global Refugees 39 6279912 19940568 12519568.49 3080538.951 
UNHCR – East Asia 39 669494 1753408 929942.82 184007.398 
UNCHR – Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 
39 3660 2495562 892524.72 802644.522 
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia 39 600670 9994746 5288832.67 1904669.045 
UNHCR – Latin America & Caribbean 39 83710 1243412 415288.69 347076.332 
UNHCR – Africa  39 2630703 7190809 4079546.38 1246806.487 
      
Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 892524.72, SD = 
802644.522) ranged from a high of 2,495,56 in FY98 to a low of 3,660 in FY81. 
Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia (M = 5288832.67, SD = 
1904669.045) ranged from a high of 9,994,746 in FY19 to a low of 600,670 in FY81. 
Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 415288.69, SD = 
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347076.332) ranged from a high of 1,243,412 in FY91 to a low of 83,710 in FY02. 
Regional refugee totals for Africa (M = 4079546.38, SD = 1246806.487) ranged from a 
high of 7,190,809 in FY19 to a low of 2,630,703 in FY010. 
Descriptive statistics for the controlling variables in RQ3, RQ4, RQ7, and RQ8 
are found in Table 6. The controlling variable in RQ3 and RQ4 was the total number of 
global refugees as reported by the UNHCR (M = 1282287.33, SD = 3105752.987) for the 
calendar year overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year, which ranged from a high of 
20,359,556 in FY19 to a low of 8,454,917 in FY81. The dependent variables for RQ7 and 
RQ8 were the regional number of refugees reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year 
overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year for each of the following regions:  
Table 6  
Total Global and Regional Refugees for the Calendar Year Overlapping the Fiscal Year 
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
Total Global Refugees 39 8454917 20359556 1282287.33 3105752.978 
UNHCR – East Asia 39 669494 1753408 943836.00 229083.859 
UNCHR – Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 
39 15734 2495562 910385.64 807439.054 
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia 39 1836452 10440189 5521419.10 1896562.065 
UNHCR – Latin America & Caribbean 39 83710 1243412 400088.18 318127.744 
UNHCR – Africa  39 2630703 7190809 4188248.82 1319980.553 
      
East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America 
and Caribbean, and Africa. Regional refugee totals for East Asia (M = 943836.00, SD = 
229083.859) ranged from a high of 1,753,408 in FY19 to a low of 669,494 in FY88. 
Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 910385.64, SD = 
807439.054) ranged from a high of 2,495,56 in FY98 to a low of 15,734 in FY88. 
Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia (M = 5521419.10, SD = 
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1896562.065) ranged from a high of 10,440,189 in FY19 to a low of 1,836,452 in FY81. 
Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 400088.18, SD = 
318127.744) ranged from a high of 1,243,412 in FY91 to a low of 83,710 in FY01. 
Regional refugee totals for Africa (M = 4188248.82, SD = 1319980.553) ranged from a 
high of 7,190,809 in FY18 to a low of 2,630,703 in FY09. 
Research Question 1 
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.  
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of the political party 
affiliation of the president on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. The final refugee 
admissions ceiling (M = 86941.03, SD = 31590.078) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used 
as the dependent variable. The total number of global refugees as reported by the 
UNHCR at the time the admissions ceiling was finalized (M = 12519568.49, SD = 
3080538.951) was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. presidential 
party affiliation of the president setting the final admissions ceiling (0.0 for Democrat, 
1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the 
independent variable.  
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To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d scores from the hierarchical 
regression analysis. The Mahalanobis d value indicates the degree to which a value is an 
outlier (Warner, 2013, p. 1097) and follows a Chi-square (χ2) distribution 
(Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, 2012) in which df is equal to the number 
of explanatory variables in the regression (Brereton, 2015, p. 10). In the analysis for 
RQ1, the critical value for Mahalanobis d was 13.816 (at α = .001). No value exceeded 
the Mahalanobis d for RQ1.  
I also generated Cook’s d scores to screen for outliers. A value is considered an 
outlier if the Cook’s d is greater than 4/(n – k – 1), where k is equal to the “number of 
terms in the model” (American Psychological Association, n.d., para. 1). In the analysis 
for RQ1, the critical value for Cook’s d was .111. The Cook’s d was 1.038 for FY81. 
Data for FY81 were removed, and a hierarchical regression was conducted for FY82-
FY19. 
After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY82-FY19, I reviewed variance 
inflation factors. Variance inflation factors were well below the 10.0 threshold that would 
indicate multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2015, p. 423) for presidential party affiliation 
(VIF = 1.000) and for total global refugees (VIF = 1.000). The normal P-P plot was 
reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for 
homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted 
values and the absolute standardized residuals (Gignac, 2019, pt. 14.13). The Pearson 
correlation was r = .355 (p = .029), indicating heteroscedasticity. A bootstrapped 
regression analysis is an appropriate method for addressing issues of heteroscedasticity in 
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general (Hartl, 2010, p. 3) and, as in this RQ, in “the case of regression models with 
heteroscedastic residuals fit to small samples” (IBM, n.d.a, para. 1). The so-called wild 
bootstrap method, specifically, has been established as a model to address heteroscedastic 
errors of unknown forms in linear regression models (Flachaire, 2005, p. 362; Gignac, 
2019, pt. 14.55). 
I conducted a bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap  
Table 7 
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ1 
   Bootstrapa 
   
   




B Bias Std. Error 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Lower Upper 
2 (Constant) 73898.220 -
14487.749 
36170.000 0.036 10855.737 106808.581 
 UNHCR Total 
Global 
Refugees – At 
Final PD/EO 
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.815 -0.004 0.008 




a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples 
 
method, with confidence intervals based on the bias corrected accelerated (BCa) method, 
which more accurately identifies the upper- and lower-bounds of the confidence interval 
when bootstrapping (IBM, n.d.a, para. 9). I reviewed the bootstrap for coefficients, and 
presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to 
the model (β = -2134.887, p = .789, 95%CI: -19162.099 and 18143.061) (see Table 7). 
The model was not found to be significant (ΔF(1, 35) = .071, p = .791, ΔR2 = .002), so 
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the model was not interpreted (see Table 8). The model failed to disprove the null 
hypothesis for RQ1. 
Table 8 














Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .108a .012 -.016 23758.057 .012 .427 1 36 .518 
2 .117b .014 -.043 24070.530 .002 .071 1 35 .791 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At Final PD/EO 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD 
 c. Dependent Variable: Annual Admissions Ceiling 
Research Question 2 
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on annual admissions through the USRAP. The total number 
of refugees admitted annually (M = 74031.03, SD = 29583.081) for each FY (FY81-
FY19) was used as the dependent variable. The total number of global refugees as 
reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping the start of the federal FY (M 
= 12519568.49, SD = 3080538.951) was entered into the first block as the controlling 
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variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president in office during the fiscal year for 
refugee admissions (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) 
was entered into the second block as the independent variable.  
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value of Mahalanobis d for RQ2 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
was .111. No values exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis d, but FY81 exceeded the 
critical value of Cook’s d at .371. Data for FY81 were removed, and a hierarchical 
regression was conducted for FY82-FY19.  
After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY82-FY19, VIFs were reviewed 
and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.000) 
and for total global refugees (VIF = 1.000). I reviewed the normal P-P plot to confirm 
that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I 
conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the 
absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = .195 (p = .241), 
indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was 
reviewed, ΔF(1, 35) = 2.502, p = .123, ΔR2 = .062 (see Table 9). Because the model was 
not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for 
RQ2. 
Table 9 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .269a .072 .047 25786.092 .072 2.805 1 36 .103 
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2 .366b .134 .085 25264.333 .062 2.502 1 35 .123 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At End FY 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At End FY, PresPartyFY 
 c. Dependent Variable: Total Annual Admissions 
Research Question 3 
RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on 
USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H03: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional allocations. 
Ha3: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional allocations. 
 I conducted a separate hierarchical regression analysis for each of the following 
regions to assess the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on annual 
regional allocations: East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South 
Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa. 
RQ3 – East Asia 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for East Asia. The regional 
allocations for East Asia (M = 30824.36, SD = 31280.316) for each FY (FY81-FY19) 
was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for East Asia (M = 
929942.82, SD = 184007.398) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional 
allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. 
Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocations (0.0 for 
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Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second 
block as the independent variable.  
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value of Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
was .111. FY19 exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis d at 24.641. Both FY19 and 
FY82 exceeded the critical value of Cook’s d at 2.247 and .113, respectively. FY19 and 
FY82 were removed from the dataset.  
I conducted a hierarchical regression for the remaining 37 fiscal years, then VIFs 
were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation 
(VIF = 1.576) and for total global refugees from East Asia (VIF = 1.576). The normal P-
P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test 
for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized 
predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = 
.114 (p = .503), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the 
model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 34) = 1.089, p = .304, ΔR2 = .031 (see Table 10). Because the 
model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null 
hypothesis for RQ3 for East Asia. 
Table 10 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .063a .004 -.025 30001.712 .004 .138 1 35 .217 




a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD 
RQ3 – Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. The regional allocations for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 
23943.59, SD = 21544.761) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent 
variable. Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 892524.72, 
SD = 802644.522) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were 
finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party 
affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for 
Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the 
independent variable.  
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d or Cook’s d. 
Variance inflation factors were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for 
presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.234) and for total global refugees from Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (VIF = 1.234). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm 
that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I 
conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the 
absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = -.102 (p = .538), 
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indicating homoscedasticity.  Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was 
reviewed, ΔF(1, 36) = .046, p = .831, ΔR2 = .001 (see Table 11). Because the model was 
not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for 
RQ3 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Table 11 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .316a .100 .075 20717.811 .100 4.094 1 37 .050 
2 .317b .101 .051 20990.176 .001 .046 1 36 .831 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, 
PresPartyPD 
RQ3 – Near East and South Asia 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for the Near East and South 
Asia region. The regional allocations for Near East and South Asia (M = 13835.90, SD = 
12555.545) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional 
refugee totals for Near East and South Asia ((M = 5288832.67, SD = 1904669.045) as 
reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered 
into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the 
president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for 





Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Regional 
Allocation for Near East and South Asia) 
 
 
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d, but values for FY19 
exceeded the critical value for Cook’s d at .114. FY19 was removed from the dataset and 
hierarchical regression was conducted for the remaining FY81-FY18 fiscal years. After 
conducting the hierarchical regression for FY81-FY18, VIFs were reviewed and were 
found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.011) and 
for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.011). The normal P-P 
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plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed (see 
Figure 1). To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the 
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson 
correlation was r = .479 (p = .002), indicating heteroscedasticity.  
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, a bootstrapped 
hierarchical regression was conducted using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence 
intervals based on BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and 
presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to 
the model (β = -11111.761, p = .008, 95%CI: -17725.682 and -4447.079) (see Table 12).  
Table 12 
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ3 for Near East and South Asia  
   Bootstrapa 
   
   








tailed) Lower Upper 
2 (Constant) 4744.414 -42.275 4918.768 .303 -3797.139 13364.171 
 UNHCR Near 
East & South 
Asia – At 
Final PD/EO 
.003 -7.537E-6 .001 .002 .001 .005 
 PresPartyPD -
11111.761 
126.147 3682.325 .008 -18057.781 -3294.171 
 
a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples 
 
The model was also found to be significant (ΔF(1, 35) = 10.016, p = .003, ΔR2 = .192) 





















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .368a .135 .111 11970.692 .135 5.636 1 36 .023 
2 .572b .328 .289 10704.999 .192 10.016 1 35 .003 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD 
 
ΔR2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for 
19.2% of variance in regional allocations set for Near East and South Asia. In addition, 
Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 can be used to determine the difference in the expected regional 
allocation for Near East and South Asia between a Democratic president and a 
Republican president using the β-values of presidential party affiliation (β = -11111.761, 
p = .008, 95%CI: -18057.781 and -3294.171) and regional refugee totals Near East and 
South Asia (β = .003, p = .002, 95%CI: .001 and .005). The equation for the expected 
Near East and South Asia regional allocation by a Democratic president was constructed 
and simplified as follows: 
(Ŷ|Democrat) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees) + -11111.761(0) 
(Ŷ|Democrat) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees) 
The equation for the expected Near East and South Asia regional allocation by a 
Republican president was constructed and simplified as follows: 
(Ŷ|Republican) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees) + -11111.761(1) 
(Ŷ|Republican) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees) – 11111.761 
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(Ŷ|Republican) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees) – 11111.761 
(Ŷ|Republican) = -6367.347 + .003(global regional refugees) 
From these equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican 
president setting regional allocations predicts a 11,112 lower regional allocation for Near 
East and South Asian refugees than a Democratic president. 
RQ3 – Latin America and Caribbean 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Latin America and 
Caribbean. The regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 13835.90, SD 
= 12555.545) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional 
refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 415288.69, SD = 347076.332) as 
reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered 
into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the 
president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for 
each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.  
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d, but values for FY94 
and FY95 exceeded the critical value for Cook’s d at .459 and .130, respectively. Both 
FY94 and FY95 was removed from the dataset and hierarchical regression was conducted 
for the remaining 37 fiscal years. 
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I conducted a hierarchical regression for the FY81-FY19 excluding FY94-FY95, 
then VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party 
affiliation (VIF = 1.050) and for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean 
(VIF = 1.050). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally 
normally distributed (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Regional 
Allocation for Latin American and Caribbean) 
 
To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the 
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson 
correlation was r = .852 (p = .032), indicating heteroscedasticity. Having met the 
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necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 34) = 10.348, p = .003, ΔR2 = 
.231 (see Table 14). Because the model was significant, the model was interpreted.  
Table 14 
















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .104a .011 -.018 1263.096 .011 .379 1 35 .542 
2 .491b .242 .197 1122.107 .231 10.348 1 34 .003 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD 
ΔR2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for 
23.1% of variance in regional allocations set for Latin America and Caribbean. The 
equation Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 can be used to determine the difference in the expected 
regional allocation for Latin America and Caribbean between a Democratic president and 
a Republican president using the β-values of presidential party affiliation (β = -1238.343, 
t(34) = -.492, p = .003, 95%CI: -2020.676 and 456.009) and regional refugee totals for 
Latin America and Caribbean (β = 1318E-5, t(34) = .004, p = .981, 95%CI: -.001 and 
.001) (see Table 15).  
Table 15 
Coefficients for RQ3 for Latin America and Caribbean  
  Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
2 (Constant) 4345.805 339.836  12.788 .000 
 UNHCR Latin 
America & Caribbean 
– At Final PD/EO 
1.318E-5 .001 .004 .024 .981 




The equation for the expected Latin America and Caribbean regional allocation 
by a Democratic president was constructed and simplified to (Ŷ|Democrat) = 4345.805 + 
1.318e-5(global regional refugees), while the equation for the expected Latin America 
and Caribbean regional allocation by a Republican president was constructed and 
simplified as (Ŷ|Republican) = 3107.462 + 1.318e-5 (global regional refugees). From 
these equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican president 
setting regional allocations predicts a 1,238 lower allocation to Latin America and 
Caribbean refugees than a Democratic president. 
RQ3 – Africa 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Africa. The regional 
allocations for Africa (M = 12138.46, SD = 8429.916) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was 
used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Africa (M = 4079546.38, SD = 
1246806.487) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were 
finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party 
affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for 
Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the 
independent variable.  
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
was .111. No fiscal years had values exceeding the critical value of Mahalanobis d at 
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24.641, but FY17 exceeded the critical value of Cook’s d at .321 and was removed from 
the dataset. I completed a hierarchical regression for the remaining 38 fiscal years, and 
VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party 
affiliation (VIF = 1.003) and for total global refugees from Africa (VIF = 1.003). The 
normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally 
distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the 
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson 
correlation was r = -.121 (p = .428), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the 
necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 35) = .628, p = .433, ΔR2 = .017 
(see Table 16). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model 
failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ3 for Africa. 
Table 16 
















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .198a .039 -.012 7600.072 .039 1.465 1 36 .234 
2 .237b .056 -.002 7639.609 .017 .628 1 35 .433 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At Final PD/EO 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD 
Research Question 4 
RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on 
USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H04: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional admissions. 
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Ha4: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant 
effect on USRAP regional admissions. 
 I conducted a separate hierarchical regression analysis for each of the following 
regions to assess the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on regional 
admissions: East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin 
America and Caribbean, and Africa. 
RQ4 – East Asia 
I conducted hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on regional admissions for East Asia. The regional admissions 
for East Asia (M = 27423.23 SD = 25594.904) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the 
dependent variable. Global refugee totals for East Asia (M = 943836.00, SD = 
229083.859) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the 
federal fiscal year were entered into the first block as the controlling variable. 
Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year 
(0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the 
second block as the independent variable.  
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ4 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
was .111. Values for FY18 and FY19 both exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis d 
at 14.414 and 14.255, respectively. Values for FY18 and FY19 also exceeded the critical 
value of Cook’s d at .301 and .261, respectively, as did FY81 at .3169. FY81, FY18, and 
FY19 were removed from the dataset, and I conducted hierarchical regression for the 
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remaining 36 fiscal years. After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY82-FY17, 
VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party 
affiliation (VIF = 1.635) and for total global refugees from East Asia (VIF – 1.635). The 
normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally 
distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the 
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson 
correlation was r = .619 (p < .001), indicating heteroscedasticity.  
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a 
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence 
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for  
Table 17 
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for East Asia  
   Bootstrapa 
   
   




B Bias Std. Error 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) Lower Upper 
2 (Constant) -
19336.773 
-20356.318 50812.576 .785 -
105977.106 
27355.102 
 UNHCR East 
Asia – At End 
FY 
.040 .021 .052 .057 -.051 .171 
 PresPartyFY 17366.612 4698.957 12227.092 .195 -5022.551 49820.407 
 
a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples 
 
coefficients was reviewed, and presidential party affiliation was not found to be a 
statistically significant contributor to the model (β = 17366.612, p = .195, 95%CI: -
5022.551 and 49820.407) (See Table 17). The model was found to be significant (ΔF(1, 
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33) = 4.774, p = .036, ΔR2 = .126) and was interpreted (see Table 18). Presidential party 
affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to refugee admissions 
from East Asia in RQ4. 
Table 18 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .015a .000 -.029 19535.816 .000 .008 1 34 .929 
2 .356b .127 .074 18534.140 .126 4.774 1 33 .036 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At End FY 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY 
RQ4 – Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
The regional admissions for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 21650.21, SD = 
20788.995) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional 
refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 910385.64, SD = 807439.054) as 
reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the federal fiscal year 
was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of 
the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for 
Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the 
independent variable.  
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ4 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
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was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d or Cook’s d. 
Pearson’s r was generated to screen for multicollinearity. Variance inflation factors were 
found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.336) and 
for total global refugees from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (VIF = 1.336). The 
normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally 
distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the 
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson 
correlation was r = .066 (p = .699), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the 
necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 36) = .297, p = .589, ΔR2 = .007 
(see Table 19). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model 
failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ4 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Table 19 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .421a .177 .155 19113.470 .177 7.954 1 37 .008 
2 .429b .184 .138 19297.787 .007 .297 1 36 .589 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At End FY 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY 
RQ4 – Near East and South Asia 
 I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the political party affiliation of the president on regional admissions for 
Near East and South Asia. The regional admissions for Near East and South Asia (M = 
11901.36, SD = 11439.865) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent 
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variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia (M = 5521419.10, SD = 
1896562.065) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the 
federal fiscal year were entered into the first block as the controlling variable. 
Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year 
(0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the 
second block as the independent variable.  
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d, but values for FY19 
exceeded the critical value for Cook’s d at .185. FY19 was removed from the dataset, and 
I conducted a hierarchical regression for the remaining FY81-FY18 fiscal years. After 
conducting the hierarchical regression for FY81-FY18, VIFs were reviewed and were 
found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.007) and 
for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.007). The normal P-P 
plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed (see 





Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Near East 
and South Asia Admissions) 
 
 
To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized 
predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = 
.355 (p = .029), indicating heteroscedasticity.  
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a 
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence 
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and 
presidential party affiliation was found to be a statistically significant contributor to the 
model (β = -11886.197, p = .002, 95%CI: -19246.045 and -4094.144) (see Table 20). The 
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model was also found to be significant (ΔF(1, 35) = 14.752, p < .001, ΔR2 = .270) and 
was interpreted (see Table 21). 
Table 20 
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for Near East and South Asia  
   Bootstrapa 
   
   




B Bias Std. Error 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) Lower Upper 
2 (Constant) 6932.176 -2133.886 6827.585 .391 -4813.157 14302.155 
 UNHCR Near 
East & South 
Asia – At End 
FY 
.002 .000 .001 .057 .000 .005 
 PresPartyFY -
11986.187 
364.281 3384.019 .002 -19246.045 -4094.144 
 
a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples 
 
Table 21 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .297a .088 .063 11126.383 .088 3.485 1 36 .070 
2 .599b .359 .322 9464.504 .270 14.752 1 35 .000 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY 
ΔR2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for 27.0% of 
variance in regional allocations set for Near East and South Asia. The equation Ŷ= a+ 
b1X1+b2X2 can be used to determine the difference in the expected regional admissions 
for Near East and South Asia between a Democratic president’s term and a Republican 
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president’s term, using the β-values of presidential party affiliation (β = -11986.197, p = 
.002, 95%CI: -19246.045 and -4094.144) and regional refugee totals for Near East and 
South Asia (β = .002, p = .057, 95%CI: .000 and .005). The equation for the expected 
Near East and South Asia regional admissions under a Democratic president was 
constructed and simplified to (Ŷ|Democrat) = 6932.176 + .002(global regional refugees), 
while the equation for the expected Near East and South Asia regional admissions under 
a Republican president was constructed and simplified as (Ŷ|Republican) = -5054.021 + 
.002 (global regional refugees). From these equations, we conclude that, all other things 
being equal, a Republican president’s term will predict 11,986 fewer admissions from 
Near East and South Asia than a Democratic president’s term. 
RQ4 – Latin America and Caribbean 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean. The 
regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 2686.8, SD = 1826.111) for 
each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for 
Latin America and Caribbean (M = 400088.18, SD = 318127.744) as reported by the 
UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the federal fiscal year were entered 
into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the 
president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) 
for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable. 
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
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was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d, but values for FY05 
and FY95 exceeded the critical value for Cook’s d at .217 and .155, respectively. Both 
FY05 and FY95 was removed from the dataset, and I conducted a hierarchical regression 
for the remaining 37 fiscal years. After conducting the second hierarchical regression, 
VIFs were reviewed and were found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party 
affiliation (VIF = 1.010) and for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean 
(VIF = 1.010). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally 
normally distributed (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Latin 
America and Caribbean Admissions) 
 
 
To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized 
predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = -
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.049 (p = .774), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the 
model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 34) = 13.238, p = .001, ΔR2 = .278 (see Table 22). Because 
the model was significant, the model can be interpreted.  
Table 22 
















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .093a .009 -.020 1542.783 .009 .303 1 35 .585 
2 .535b .286 .244 1327.989 .278 13.238 1 34 .001 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY 
ΔR2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for 
27.8% of variance in regional allocations set for Latin America and Caribbean. The 
equation Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 can be used to determine the difference in the expected 
regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean between a Democratic president’s 
term and a Republican president’s term using the β-values of presidential party affiliation 
(β = -.530, p = .001, 95%CI: -2533.884 and -717.689) and regional refugee totals for 
Latin America and Caribbean (β = .001, p = .327, 95%CI: -.001 and .002) (see Table 23).  
Table 23 
Coefficients for RQ4 for Latin America and Caribbean  
  Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
2 (Constant) 3125.422 431.082  7.250 .000 
 UNHCR Latin 
America & Caribbean 
Refugees – At End FY 
.001 .001 .145 .995 .327 




The equation for the expected Latin America and Caribbean regional allocation under a 
Democratic president was constructed and simplified to (Ŷ|Democrat) = 3125.422 + 
.001(global regional refugees), while the equation for the expected Latin America and 
Caribbean regional allocation under a Republican president was constructed and 
simplified as (Ŷ|Republican) = 1499.636 + .001(global regional refugees). From these 
equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican president’s term 
predicts 1,450 fewer admissions per fiscal year from Latin America and Caribbean than a 
Democratic president’s term. 
RQ4 – Africa 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party 
affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Africa. The regional admissions for 
Africa (M = 10369.38, SD = 7964.187) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the 
dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Africa (M = 4188248.82, SD = 
1319980.553) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping the start of 
the fiscal year was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential 
party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for 
Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second 
block as the independent variable.  
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The 
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value 
was .111. No fiscal years had values exceeding the critical value of Mahalanobis d, but 
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values for FY16 and FY04 exceeded the critical value of Cook’s d at .168 and .122, 
respectively, and were removed from the dataset. 
A hierarchical regression was completed for the remaining 37 fiscal years, then 
VIFs were reviewed and were found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party 
affiliation (VIF = 1.005) and for total global refugees from Africa (VIF = 1.005). The 
normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally 
distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the 
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson 
correlation was r = -.327 (p = .045), indicating heteroscedasticity.  
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a 
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence 
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and 
presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to 
the model (β = -3019.932, p = .181, 95%CI: -6485.009 and -500.106) (see Table 24).  
Table 24 
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for Africa  
   Bootstrapa 
   
   




B Bias Std. Error 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) Lower Upper 
2 (Constant) 11683.376 1475.680 4239.065 .009 3344.971 23409.619 
 UNHCR 
Africa - At 
End FY 
.000 .000 .001 .897 -.002 .001 
 PresPartyFY -3019.932 -464.780 2129.120 .181 -6485.009 -500.106 
 




The model was found to be significant (ΔF(1, 35) = 14.752, p < .001, ΔR2 = .270) and 
was interpreted (see Table 25). Presidential party affiliation was not found to be a 
statistically significant contributor to refugee admissions from Africa in RQ4. 
Table 25 
















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .012a .000 -.028 6684.901 .000 .005 1 35 .943 
2 .228b .052 -.004 6604.767 .052 1.854 1 34 .182 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At End FY 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY 
Research Question 5 
RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual 
admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H05: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
Ha5: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the 
USRAP annual admissions ceiling. 
 In RQ1, no effect of presidential party affiliation was found on the annual 
admissions ceiling, meaning that there is no effect to test for the extent of moderation by 
the Senate and House majorities. Therefore, no statistical tests were conducted for RQ5. 
128 
 
Research Question 6 
RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions 
through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals? 
H06: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP. 
Ha6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total 
annual admissions through the USRAP. 
In RQ2, no effect of presidential party affiliation was found on the annual refugee 
admissions through the USRAP, meaning that there is no effect to test for the extent of 
moderation by the Senate and House majorities. Therefore, no statistical tests were 
conducted for RQ6. 
Research Question 7 
RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional 
allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H07: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional allocations. 
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Ha7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional allocations. 
 In RQ3, presidential party affiliation was found to effect regional allocations only 
for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. I conducted separate 
hierarchical regression analyses for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and 
Caribbean to determine the moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on 
regional allocations for each of these regions. As RQ3 found that party affiliation of the 
president had no effect on regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, and Africa, no statistical analyses were performed for these regions, as there was no 
effect to moderate. 
RQ7 – Near East and South Asia 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of 
the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the 
president on the annual regional allocation for Near East and South Asia. The regression 
was conducted with data from FY81-FY18, as FY19 data was removed from the dataset 
in RQ3 for exceeding the critical value for Cook’s d. The regional allocations for Near 
East and South Asia (M = 13963.16, SD = 12698.567) (see Table 26) for each FY (FY81-
FY18) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and 
South Asia (M = 5164992.84, SD = 1763953.167) (see Table 26) as reported by the 
UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first 
block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the 
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final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-
FY18) was entered into the second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of 
the Senate majority at the time regional allocations were set (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for 
Republican) and party affiliation of the House majority at the time regional allocations 
were set, expressed as Senate majority x House majority, for each FY (FY81-FY18) was 
entered into the third block as the moderating variable. 
Table 26 
Regional Allocations and Regional Refugee Totals for Near East and South Asia, 
Excluding FY19 
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
RA – Near East & South Asia 38 2500 40000 13963.16 12698.567 
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia – 
at Final PD/EO 
38 600670 8979185 5164992.84 1763953.167 
 
Variance inflation factors were below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation 
(VIF = 1.071), for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.015), 
and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.068). The normal P-P plot was 
reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for 
homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted 
values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = .530 (p = 
.001), indicating heteroscedasticity.  
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a 
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence 
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and 
131 
 
Senate majority x House majority was not found to be a statistically significant 
contributor to the model (β = -6265.272, p = .074, 95%CI: -12247.629 and -897.508) (see 
Table 27).  
Table 27 
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ7 for Near East and South Asia  
   Bootstrapa 
   
   




B Bias Std. Error 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) Lower Upper 
3 (Constant) 8247.286 467.284 4176.299 .090 -949.584 17927.591 
 UNHCR Near 
East & South 
Asia – At 
Final PD/EO 
.003 -5.757E-5 .001 .002 .002 .004 
 PresPartyPD -
12528.370 
-143.177 3413.530 .002 -19367.446 -6041.229 




-6265.272 -259.552 3065.433 .074 -12247.629 -.897.508 
 
a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples 
 
The model was not found to be significant (ΔF(1, 34) = 2.892, p = .098, ΔR2 = 
.053) and was not interpreted (see Table 28). Senate and House majority party affiliations 
were not shown to be significant for Near East and South Asia in RQ7. 
Table 28 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .368a .135 .111 11970/692 .135 5.636 1 36 .023 
2 .572b .328 .289 10704.999 .192 10.016 1 35 .003 




a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD 
 c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD, 
Senate x House Majority at PD  
RQ7 – Latin America and Caribbean 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of 
the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the 
president on the annual regional allocation for Latin America and Caribbean. The 
regression was conducted with data from FY81-FY19 with FY94-FY95 excluded, as 
FY94-FY95 data was removed from the dataset in RQ3 for exceeding the critical value 
for Cook’s d. The regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 3614.86, 
SD = 1252.157) (see Table 29) for each FY (FY81-FY18) was used as  
Table 29 
Regional Allocations & Regional Refugee Totals for Latin America and Caribbean, 
Excluding FY94-FY95 
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
RA – Latin America & Caribbean 37 1000 6000 3614.86 1252.157 
UNHCR – Latin America & 
Caribbean – at Final PD/EO 
37 83710 1243412 407596.62 343399.162 
 
the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 
407596.62, SD = 343399.162) (see Table 29) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the  
regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling 
variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation 
(0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19; FY94-FY95 excluded) 
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was entered into the second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the 
Senate majority at the time regional allocations were set (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for 
Republican) and party affiliation of the House majority at the time regional allocations 
were set, expressed as Senate majority x House majority, for each FY (FY81-FY18) was 
entered into the third block as the moderating variable. 
Variance inflation factors were below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party 
affiliation (VIF = 1.089), for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean 
(VIF = 1.275), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.305). To test for 
homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted 
values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = .779 (p = 
.048), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model 
was reviewed, ΔF(1, 33) = .010, p = .919, ΔR2 = .000 (see Table 30).  
Table 30 
















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .104a .011 -.018 1263.096 .011 .379 1 35 .542 
2 .491b .242 .197 1122.107 .231 10.348 1 34 .003 
3 .492c .242 .173 1138.802 .000 .010 1 33 .919 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD 
 c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD,  
  Senate x House Majority at PD  
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Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to 
disprove the null hypothesis for RQ7 for Latin America and Caribbean. 
Research Question 8 
RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities 
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional 
admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region? 
H08: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional admissions. 
Ha8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do 
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on 
USRAP regional admissions. 
 In RQ4, presidential party affiliation was found to effect regional admissions only 
for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. I conducted separate 
hierarchical regression analyses for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and 
Caribbean to determine the moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on 
regional admissions for each of these regions. As RQ4 found that party affiliation of the 
president had no effect on regional admissions for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, nor Africa, no statistical analyses were performed for these regions, as there was no 





RQ8 – Near East and South Asia 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of 
the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the 
president on the annual regional admissions for Near East and South Asia. The regression 
was conducted with data from FY81-FY18, as FY19 was excluded from the dataset for 
exceeding the critical value of Cook’s d. The regional admissions for Near East and 
South Asia (M = 12140.84, SD = 11493.928) (see Table 31) for each FY (FY81-FY18) 
was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia 
(M = 5391977.789, SD = 1738693.374) (see Table 31) as reported by the UNHCR for the 
calendar year overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year.  
Table 31 
Regional Admissions and Regional Refugee Totals for Near East and South Asia, 
Excluding FY19 
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
RA – Near East & South Asia 38 2854 38280 12140.84 11493.928 
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia – 
at End FY 
38 1836452 9994746 5391977.789 1738693.374 
 
Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year 
(0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY18) was entered into the 
second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the Senate majority for all 
or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) and party affiliation of 
the House majority for all or most of the fiscal year, expressed as Senate majority party x 
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House majority party, for each FY (FY81-FY18) was entered into the third block as the 
moderating variable. 
Variance inflation factors were well below the 10.0 threshold for presidential 
party affiliation (VIF = 1.041), for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia 
(VIF = 1.010), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.037). The normal P-P 
plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test 
for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized 
predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = 
.592 (p < .001), indicating heteroscedasticity.  
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a 
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence 
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and 
Senate majority x House majority was not found to be a statistically significant 
contributor to the model (β = -6265.272, p = .074, 95%CI: -12247.629 and -897.508) (see 
Table 32). 
Table 32 
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ8 for Near East and South Asia  
   Bootstrapa 
   
   




B Bias Std. Error 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) Lower Upper 
3 (Constant) 10628.218 -1767.141 5797.885 .129 632.677 16603.817 
 UNHCR Near 
East & South 
Asia – At End 
FY 





327.139 3237.317 .002 -19816.634 -5325.222 




-6451.501 567.017 3127.111 .063 -13078.613 1456.577 
 
a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples 
 
The model was found to be significant (ΔF(1, 34) = 4.469, p = .042, ΔR2 = .075) and was 
interpreted (see Table 33). Senate and House majority party affiliations were not shown 
to be significant for Near East and South Asia in RQ8. 
Table 33 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .297a .088 .063 11126.383 .088 3.485 1 36 .070 
2 .599b .359 .322 9464.504 .270 14.752 1 35 .000 
3 .658c .433 .383 9027.657 .075 4.469 1 34 .042 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY 
 c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY, Senate x  
  House for FY 
RQ8 – Latin America and Caribbean 
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of 
the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the 
president on the annual regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean. The 
regression was conducted with data from FY81-FY19 with FY95 and FY05 excluded 
from the dataset as they exceeded the critical value of Cook’s d. The regional admissions 
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for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 2444.84, SD = 1527.785) (see Table 34) for each 
FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was used as the dependent variable. 
Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 414221.03 SD = 
320506.664) (see Table 34) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping 
the start of the federal fiscal year for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) 
was entered into the first box as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of 
the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for 
Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was entered into the 
second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the Senate majority for all 
or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) and party affiliation of 
the House majority for all or most of the fiscal year, expressed as Senate majority x 
House majority, for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was entered into 
the third block as the moderating variable. 
Table 34 
Regional Admissions and Regional Refugee Total for Latin America and Caribbean, 
Excluding FY94-FY95 
 N Minimum Maximum M SD 
RA – Latin America & Caribbean 37 131 6156 2444.84 1527.785 
UNHCR – Latin America & 
Caribbean – at End FY 
37 83710 1243412 414221.03 320506.664 
 
Variance inflation factors were below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation 
(VIF = 1.041), for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean (VIF = 
1.270), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.310). The normal P-P plot was 
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reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for 
homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted 
values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = -.085 (p = 
.616), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model 
was reviewed, ΔF(1, 33) = .787, p = .382, ΔR2 = .017 (see Table 35). Because the model 
was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null 
hypothesis for RQ8 for Latin America and Caribbean. 
Table 35 
















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .093a .009 -.020 1542.783 .009 .303 1 35 .585 
2 .535b .286 .244 1327.989 .278 13.238 1 34 .001 
3 .550c .303 .240 1332.174 .017 .787 1 33 .382 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY 
 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY 
 c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY,  
  Senate x House for FY 
 
Summary 
 Regression analysis of RQ1, the effect of presidential party affiliation on the 
annual refugee ceiling, failed to disprove the null hypothesis that presidential party 
affiliation has no significant effect on the annual refugee ceiling. Likewise, analysis of 
the regression model for RQ2, the effect of presidential party affiliation on total annual 
admissions, failed to disprove the null hypothesis that presidential party affiliation has no 
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significant effect on annual refugee admissions. With no effect of presidential party 
affiliation on the refugee ceiling or total annual admissions found in RQ1 and RQ2, no 
effect existed to moderate and RQ5 and RQ6 were rendered moot. 
 Analysis for RQ3, the effect of presidential party affiliation on regional 
allocations, showed mixed results. Analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis for 
regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Africa that 
presidential party affiliation has no effect on regional allocations. A significant effect was 
shown for Near East and South Asia, with analysis finding that a Republican president 
setting regional allocations predicts a regional allocation 11,112 lower for the Near East 
and South Asia than a Democratic president. A significant effect was also shown for 
Latin America and Caribbean, with analysis finding that a Republican president setting 
regional allocations predicts a regional allocation 1,238 lower for Latin America and 
Caribbean than a Democratic president. 
 Mixed results were also found for different regions in RQ4, the effect of 
presidential party affiliation on regional admissions. Analysis failed to disprove the null 
hypothesis that presidential party affiliation has no effect for East Asia, Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, and Africa. Analysis also found that a Republican president’s term 
predicts 11,986 fewer admissions from Near East and South Asia than a Democratic 
president’s term. Similarly, a Republican president’s term was found to predict 1,450 




 Moderation analysis was conducted for RQ7 on regional allocations for Near East 
and South Asia as well as Latin America and Caribbean, the two regions in which 
significant effect for presidential party affiliation was found in RQ3. In analyzing the 
moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on the effect of presidential party 
affiliation on regional allocations, analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis that the 
Senate and House majorities do not moderate presidential party affiliation on regional 
allocations. 
 For RQ8, moderation analysis was conducted to examine the moderating effect of 
Senate and House majorities on presidential party affiliation on regional admissions from 
Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean, the two regions in which 
significant effect for presidential party affiliation was found in RQ4. In analyzing the 
moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on the effect of presidential party 
affiliation on regional admissions, analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis that the 
Senate and House majorities do not moderate presidential party affiliation on regional 
admissions. 
 In Chapter 5, I will discuss these findings as they relate to the literature presented 
in Chapter 2 and analyze these findings within the theoretical framework of historical 
institutionalism. Chapter 5 will also include discussion of limitations in this study with 
recommendations for future study and will conclude with a discussion of the implications 
of this study for positive social change.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the president’s political 
party affiliation on proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions 
ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP, 
while controlling for global refugee numbers, in aggregate and by region. I also sought to 
determine the moderating effect of the political party affiliations of the Senate and House 
majorities This quantitative study was nonexperimental and correlative in design, relying 
on hierarchical regression analysis to answer the study’s RQs, with the intention of 
assisting resettlement agencies in anticipating and preparing for future refugee 
admissions.  
I found that presidential party affiliation had no significant effect on the annual 
admissions ceiling or on total annual refugee admissions. Presidential party affiliation 
also had no significant effect on regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, or Africa. Having a Republican president set regional allocations, however, 
predicted a regional allocation 11,112 lower for the Near East and South Asia and a 
regional allocation 1,238 lower for Latin America and Caribbean. Likewise, a Republican 
president’s term predicted 11,986 fewer admissions from Near East and South Asia and 
1,450 fewer admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean.  
I analyzed the moderating effect of the party affiliations of the Senate and House 
majorities only for those regions for which presidential party affiliation was shown to 
have a significant effect that could potentially be moderated. Senate and House majority 
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affiliation was shown to have no significant moderating effect on regional allocations for 
Near East and South Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean. Similarly, Senate and 
House majority party affiliation was also shown to have no significant moderating effect 
on admissions from Near East and South Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
Resettlement agencies and human rights organizations have long held that the 
USRAP holds bipartisan support (Human Rights First, n.d.; USCRI, 2017). This 
contention was supported, at a macrolevel, in this study in that presidential party 
affiliation was found to have no significant effect on the annual admissions ceiling or on 
annual refugee admissions in the aggregate. When looking at regional allocations and 
admissions, however, bipartisan support waned. Democratic presidents were found to 
have greater levels of support for refugees from Near East and South Asia as well as 
Latin America and the Caribbean, as having a Democratic president predicts a 11,112 
higher ceiling and 11,986 more admissions from Near East and South Asia and a 1,238 
higher ceiling and 1,450 more admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean than a 
Republican president. It is not inaccurate, then, to state that the USRAP has bipartisan 
support, but the caveat is that the regional makeup of refugees admitted through the 
USRAP has statistically significant differences under presidents of different parties. 
When the Refugee Act of 1980 was first proposed to Congress, opponents of the 
Refugee Act argued that it would undermine the existing immigration policies that 
favored Europeans (Scribner 2017, p. 268). This study found that an average of 74, 031 
refugees were admitted annually between FY81-FY19. This average constitutes less than 
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8% of all legal immigrants to the United States in those same years (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2020). At these admissions levels, the refugee program is unlikely to 
tip the scales of immigration in any significant direction related to European versus non-
European immigration overall. 
Proponents of the Refugee Act praised the act as a mechanism for giving “greater 
and more explicit power…with regard to the numbers and nature of refugees to be 
admitted to [the United States]” (H.R Rep. No. 69-2, at 4500 (1980)). In this study, I 
specifically examined the extent to which Congress moderated the effect of presidential 
party affiliation on refugee admissions, rather than all possible ways in which Congress 
could affect “the numbers and nature of refugees” admitted to the United States. Within 
the parameters of this study, however, Congress was not shown to moderate the effect of 
presidential party affiliation on proposed or actual refugee admissions. 
I noted in Chapter 2 that much of the literature on refugee policy and admissions 
addresses legislation enacted by Congress, examining motivations for legislation, results 
of legislation, and partisan voting records (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Brown & 
Scribner, 2014; Fussell, 2014; Kerwin, 2018; Martin & Ferris, 2017; Steil & Vasi, 2014; 
Teitelbaum, 1980; Triadafilopoulos, 2010; Welch, 2014; Zolberg, 1998), despite the fact 
that refugee admissions to the United States are based on presidential determination 
rather than on Congressional legislation. This study has demonstrated that presidential 
party affiliation does not affect the annual admissions ceiling or annual admissions, but 
does affect regional allocations and admissions, with Democratic rather than Republican 
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presidents predicting increased allocations to and admissions from the Near East and 
South Asia region and the Latin America and Caribbean region. 
Another gap in the literature identified in Chapter 2 was the difference between 
political rhetoric on refugee policy and political actions that affect refugee admissions. In 
spite of the restrictionist rhetoric among Republican politicians (Fennelly et al., 2015; 
Fussell, 2014), the overall admissions ceiling and annual refugee admissions were not 
significantly affected by the party affiliation of the president, meaning that Republican 
presidents had no significant effect on reducing the admissions ceiling or refugee 
admissions to the United States. In line with Republican rhetoric against Latinx 
immigrant and Muslim immigrants, however, Republican presidents predict lower 
regional allocations and fewer refugee admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean 
and Near East and South Asia. Although the overall refugee program maintained integrity 
regardless of the president’s political affiliation, refugees from specific regions were 
significantly affected by the president’s party. These results aligned with the rhetoric of 
each party. 
Reny (2017) demonstrated that Republican candidates are more likely to rely on 
anti-immigrant appeals to gain support than Democratic candidates (p. 736). The 
Democratic Party has shown greater support for Latinx immigrants (Hajal & Rivera, 
2014) and Muslim immigrants (Doucerain et al., 2018; Newman, 2018) than the 
Republican Party. It is noteworthy, then, that Republican presidents are a predictor of 
lower regional allocations and admissions from both Latin America and the Caribbean 
and Near East and South Asia. Although not all countries in Near East and South Asia are 
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Muslim-majority countries, 81% are, which is the highest percentage of Muslim-majority 
countries in a single region, comparted to 33% in both Africa and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, 9% in East Asia, and 0% in Latin America and Caribbean, according to the 
CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).  
This reduction of immigrants from the Near East and South Asia, the region with 
the greatest percentage of Muslim-majority countries, aligns with positions held by both 
rank and file Republicans, as well as Republican politicians. Long before opposition to 
Muslim refugees became a talking point for Republican presidential primary candidates 
in 2016 (Nagel, 2016; Scribner, 2017), Muslim and other Middle Eastern refugees had 
been a security concern to Republican politicians since the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Barkdull 
et al., 2012; Disney, 2017). One study showed that 73% of Republicans agreed that 
banning Muslim immigrants was needed to prevent terrorism (Schmidt, 2019) and for 
certain Americans, Muslim refugees pose economic, security, and cultural threats 
(Breshnahan et al., 2018). The reductions in refugee admissions from the Near East and 
South Asia region under Republican administrations highlights one way in which these 
views of Muslims are carried out in a tangible form. 
Recent literature has focused on refugee policy under the Trump administration, 
with cuts to the admissions ceiling drawing significant attention (Ferwerda et al., 2017; 
Fullerton, 2017; Kerwin, 2018; Scriber, 2017). Despite cuts to the admissions ceiling and 
refugee admissions under the Trump administration, only FY81, under the Carter (D) 
administration for the setting of the refugee ceiling and Reagan (R) administration for the 
majority of the fiscal year of arrivals, was found to be a statistical outlier when 
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conducting regression analyses for RQ1 and RQ2. Historical institutionalism views 
radical changes within institutions, such as political parties, as either resulting from the 
accumulation of gradual changes over time (Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen, 2015) or as the 
result of an exogenous shock (Fioretos, 2011). Trump’s approach to U.S. refugee policy 
has largely been treated as an exogenous shock by the existing literature. The findings of 
this study, however, indicate that Trump’s admissions ceilings FY17-FY19 and refugee 
admissions FY17-FY19 were not statistical outliers and show that, even when accounting 
for FY17-FY19, presidential party affiliation had no significant effect on the admissions 
ceiling or refugee admissions.  
Trump’s regional allocations were, generally, not found to be outliers, either. 
Only the regional allocations for Near East and South Asia in FY19 and East Asia in 
FY19 were found to be outliers when both values exceeded the critical value for Cook’s 
d. After excluding these outliers, however, only regional allocations for Near East and 
South Asia were found to be significantly affected by presidential party affiliation, with 
lower allocations predicted by a Republican president. The predictive value of a 
Republican presidency on Near East and South Asian refugee allocations indicates that 
Trump’s outlier for that specific regional allocation in FY19 was not a total departure 
from the history of the Republican Party. Although the FY19 Near East and South Asia 
regional allocation was an outlier, a history of significantly lower allocations to the Near 
East and South Asia by Republican presidents points to the accumulation of actions over 
the history of the USRAP as the cause for Trump’s outlier of an allocation to that region, 
rather than a radical change in direction. 
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Regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Africa 
were all found to be unaffected by presidential party affiliation, even when accounting for 
allocations by the Trump administration. Although regional allocations for Latin America 
and the Caribbean were affected by presidential party affiliation, none of Trump’s 
regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean were found to be outliers. When 
considering the whole of the USRAP’s history, Republican presidents were correlated 
with lower allocations to Latin America and the Caribbean, and Trump is not found to be 
anomalous. 
FY18 and FY19 admissions from Near East and South Asia, both under the 
Trump administration, were outliers, as they exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis 
d. Even without including these years of the Trump administration, however, Republican 
presidents were correlated with lower arrivals from Near East and South Asia. Like the 
outliers for regional allocations found under the Trump administrations, these outliers in 
regional admissions follow a pattern of lower admissions under Republican 
administrations, rather than a shift in direction under the Trump presidency.  
Limitations 
 This study was limited to the Senate and House majorities, rather than looking at 
individual members of the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary and their 
relative influence on their respective committees. I also did not account for the nature of 
the relationships between individual members and the president. This study was also 
limited in that its analysis was of Congressional majorities as Senate majority x House 
majority rather than the Senate and House independently. 
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 This study was also limited to the analysis of the effect of political party 
affiliation. I did not consider external political factors that could be confounding 
variables, such as U.S. military engagement, which has shown to affect global refugee 
situations and U.S. refugee resettlement (Berman, 2011). The use of global refugee levels 
and the number of total refugees by region as control variables in this study does partially 
address changes to the global climate related to refugees but does not address political 
events specifically. By taking data from each year since the passage of the Refugee Act 
of 1980, FY81-FY19 and each year of global refugee data for calendar years 1979-2018 
from the UNHCR, outcomes of this study are valid as the entire population being studied 
was available rather than a sample of the population. 
 Because PRM’s regional groupings of countries changed over time, each FY 
(FY81-FY03) required some level of recategorization of countries into regional in order 
to align with current regional groupings. Additionally, the UNHCR does not categorize 
countries into regions in their annual data, and countries of nationality and countries of 
first asylum were grouped into regions corresponding with Department of State regional 
designations. These categorizations and recategorizations into groupings that could be 
compared over time are a potential threat to internal validity in this study (see Babbie, 
2017). In discussions of the relationship between the Trump administration, it should be 
noted that the FYs included in this study only account for a portion of the years of the 
Trump administration and do not include presidential determinations for FY20 nor FY21 




 There are several potential areas for future research to build on this study. I used a 
single moderating variable of Senate majority x House majority, but future researchers 
could examine the influence of the Senate and House majorities separately. By doing so, 
they could identify whether a specific chamber of Congress has more influence on 
moderating the annual ceiling, regional allocations, total admissions, or regional 
admissions than the chambers combined.  
This study controlled for changing global refugee levels, both in the aggregate 
and by region. Refugee situations are often caused by armed conflict (Simeon, 2017, p. 
2), and conflicts in which the United States has military involvement are known to affect 
refugee admissions to the country (Berman, 2011). Including either military conflicts in 
general or U.S. military conflicts specifically in future studies could provide insight into 
additional causes for the variance in regional allocations and regional admissions. 
Previous researchers (Barkdull, et al., 2012; Brown & Scribner, 2014; Gonzalez 
Benson, 2016) have mostly focused on the effects of Congressional legislation on refugee 
arrivals. This study’s findings highlighted that presidential party affiliation predicts 
regional allocations and arrivals for Near East and South Asia, as well as Latin America 
and Caribbean. There is room for additional study to be done on other ways in which 
presidential administrations affect refugee arrivals through the USRAP. 
For a more thorough analysis of the extent to which the Trump administration 
constituted a continuation of or departure from prior Republican administrations, a study 
that includes data from all FYs impacted by the Trump administration would be useful. 
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President Trump issued presidential determinations in FY20 and in FY21. Additionally, 
admissions in FY20 were conducted under the Trump administration. Adding these data 
to a study would provide a more comprehensive picture of Trump’s impact on refugee 
admissions to the United States. 
Implications 
 I conducted this study with the intention of assisting resettlement agencies in 
anticipating and preparing for future refugee admissions. Being able to anticipate the 
backgrounds of the refugees they will be serving allows resettlement agencies to prepare 
for culturally and linguistically appropriate service provision, which may involve changes 
in staffing, securing interpreters, translating documents and materials, and training staff 
on the cultural backgrounds of the refugees arriving to the United States. Being able to 
anticipate the overall number of refugees allows agencies to prepare overall staffing 
levels, according to the anticipated number of clients to be served. 
 This study informs agencies that the admissions ceiling and annual admissions are 
not significantly affected by the president’s political party. This study also finds that 
resettlement agencies may expect higher Near East and South Asia and Latin America 
and Caribbean admissions during a Democratic presidency. Despite the effect of 
presidential party affiliation on regional admissions, the effect on Near East and South 
Asia admissions accounts for 27.0% of the variance in admissions and the effect on Latin 
America and Caribbean admissions accounts for 27.8% of the variance in admissions. As 
the remaining 73% and 72.2% of the variances, respectively, have not been accounted for 
by presidential party affiliation, it is not recommended that resettlement agencies make 
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staffing decisions or other costly organizational changes on the basis of presidential party 
alone. 
 This study also provides resettlement agencies, human rights organizations, and 
advocacy groups with ways in which they can focus their advocacy and lobbying efforts. 
As presidential party affiliation has been shown to have no significant effect on the 
admissions ceiling nor annual admissions, advocacy on increasing the admissions ceiling, 
often a focus of resettlement agency advocacy (Feliz, 2015; Lutheran Immigrant and 
Refugee Services, 2018; Refugees International, 2020; USCRI, 2001), need not be 
partisan focused. This study suggests that presidents exert more influence over the 
distribution of refugee arrivals across global regions, which would indicate that the 
president, rather than members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, is a more 
appropriate focus of advocacy on regional allocations. Likewise, this study suggests that 
the president is the most appropriate focus for advocacy on the overall admissions 
ceiling, rather than Senate and House Judiciary Committee members.  
Conclusion 
 In spite of increasing polarization between Democrats and Republicans on issues 
of immigration and refugee policy, presidential party affiliation has no significant effect 
on the annual admissions ceiling or annual refugee admissions. Resettlement agencies 
can be confident, based on the findings of this study, that refugee admissions are not 
significantly affected by the party affiliation of the president. Effects of presidential party 
can be seen, however, in higher numbers of refugees from the Near East and South Asia 
as well as Latin America and Caribbean under the administrations of Democratic 
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presidents. While presidential party may affect the distribution of refugee slots between 
regions, they do not account for the majority of the variance in admissions from any 
region and do not provide a full accounting for the variances in regional admissions and 
the majority of variances in regional allocations (76.9% - 80.8%) and regional admissions 
(72.2% - 73.0%) is due to factors other than presidential party affiliation that can be the 
focus of future study in this area. 
 The rhetoric of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and Presidency related to 
immigrants in general and refugees in specific resulted in an explosion of literature on 
Trump’s takes on refugee policy, with many articles characterizing admissions ceilings, 
regional allocations, and refugee admissions under the Trump administration as 
anomalies when compared to the rest of the USRAP’s history since FY81. Contrary to 
these characterizations, no admissions ceiling nor annual admissions total was found to 
be an outlier when considered within the FY81-FY19 dataset, and the only outlier among 
regional allocations was for Near East and South Asia in FY19. In terms of regional 
admissions, admissions from East Asia in FY18-FY19 and admissions from Near East 
and South Asia in FY19 were all found to be outliers during the Trump administration. 
These outliers, however, paint a narrower picture of anomalies under the Trump 
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Appendix A: Countries Categorized as East Asia 
 I categorized countries as being part of East Asia if they were included in the 
countries and areas served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs (U.S. Department of State, n.d.b). These countries and areas include 
• Australia 
• Brunei 













• New Zealand 








• Solomon Islands 








The following countries and areas were represented in the UNHCR’s list of refugee 
nationalities and were included in East Asia, despite not being listed as a country or area 
served by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Tibet and Niue. 
The U.S. Department of State (2019a) noted that Tibet is the Tibet Autonomous Region 
and categorizes it as part of China. Tibet was included in East Asia because China is 
included in this region. Niue is a territory of New Zealand U.S. Department of State, 
2020) and is geographically located between New Zealand and Solomon Islands. Based 




Appendix B: Countries Categorized as Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
 I categorized countries as being part of Eastern Europe & Central Asia if they 
were a country or area served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs. I excluded Western European countries or former Soviet countries 
served by the Bureau of South and Central Asia. Countries and areas served by the 




















• North Macedonia 
• Poland 
• Romania 
• Russian Federation 




• Ukraine (U.S. Department of State, n.d.c) 






• Uzbekistan (U.S. Department of State, n.d.e) 
In fiscal years prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the UNHCR reported refugees from 
the Soviet Union. As former Soviet countries are included in Eastern Europe and Central 




Appendix C: Countries Categorized as Near East and South Asia 
 I categorized countries as being part of the Near East & South Asia if they were a 
country or areas served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 
or a country or area served by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs that was not 
already included as part of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Countries and areas served 



















• United Arab Emirates 
• Yemen (U.S. Department of State, n.d.d) 
Countries or areas served by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and not 








• Sri Lanka (U.S. Department of State, n.d.e) 
The following countries and areas were represented in the UNHCR’s list of 
refugee nationalities and were included in Near East & South Asia, despite not being 
listed as a country or area served by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs or the Bureau of 
South and Central Asian Affairs: Palestine and Western Sahara. 
According to the U.S. Department of State (2016), Israel includes “areas subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority” (p. 69), so refugees identified as Palestinian by 
the UNHCR were included in Near East & South Asia. Western Sahara is a disputed area 
in northern Africa and claimed by Morocco, which administers the majority of the 




Appendix D: Countries Categorized as Latin America and Caribbean 
 I categorized countries as being part of Latin America & Caribbean if they were a 
country or area served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, excluding Canada (U.S. Department of State, n.d.f). These countries and areas 
include 








• Costa Rica 
• Cuba 
• Dominica 
• Dominican Republic 
• Ecuador 














• Saint Kitts and Nevis 
• Saint Lucia 
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
• Suriname 
• Trinidad and Tobago 
• Uruguay 
• Venezuela 
The following countries and areas were represented in the UNHCR’s list of 
refugee nationalities and were included in Latin America & Caribbean, despite not being 
listed as a country or area served by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: 
• Cayman Islands 
• Curaçao 
• French Guiana 
• Turks and Caicos Islands 
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The U.S. Department of State (2020) lists both the Cayman Islands and the Turks and 
Caicos Islands as territories of the United Kingdom. Despite their relationship with the 
UK, however, both territories are geographically located in the Caribbean Sea and were, 
therefore, included in the Latin America & Caribbean region. Likewise, although 
Curaçao is a Dutch territory (U.S. Department of State, 2020), it was included in the 
Latin America & Caribbean region due to its location in the Caribbean Sea. French 
Guiana is a “first-order administrative [division] of overseas France” (U.S. Department of 
State, 2020, para. 5). As French Guiana is located in South America, it was included in 




Appendix E: Countries Categorized as Africa 
 I categorized countries as being part of Africa if they were a country or area 
served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs (U.S. Department of 




• Burkina Faso 
• Burundi 
• Cabo Verde 
• Cameroon 
• Central African Republic 
• Chad 
• Comoros 
• Côte d’Ivoire 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo 
• Djibouti 






















• Republic of the Congo 
• Rwanda 
• São Tomé and Príncipe 
• Sierre Leone 
• Somalia 
• South Africa 
• South Sudan 
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• Sudan 
• Tanzania 
• Togo 
• Uganda 
• Zambia 
• Zimbabwe 
 
